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MARK D. NOBLE: Testing the Blowback Thesis  
(Under the direction of KEN BOLLEN and CHARLES KURZMAN) 
Social scientific analyses of anti-American terrorism primarily seek explanations in the 
political, economic, and social conditions of states where Americans are attacked. A prominent  
counter-narrative places the focus on U.S. foreign policies positing that anti-American terrorism 
is  “blowback” for them. The few studies that analyze anti-American terrorism  as a potential 
consequence of U.S. actions abroad do not examine if there are long-term or cumulative effects 
of U.S. policies and actions.  In order to effectively determine if terror events are truly 
“blowback” we must integrate an examination of long-term effects. To inject cumulative effects 
into the discussion, this paper evaluates six methodological approaches to that end and applies 
them to two replicated studies that are most consistent to the concept of “blowback”. The 
analysis demonstrates that military dependency is integral to explanations of anti-American 
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Importance of Topic 
The causes of terrorism against America and its allies are not accurately understood 
today. The social scientific literature still lacks an accounting of the most important causes of 
anti-Western terrorism. All across the Western world, after a foiled or successful attack, 
government officials make pronouncements as to the reasons why someone would cause terror, 
fear, death, and or destruction to their citizens. Commonly, the underlying causes pronounced 
are that terrorists have a hatred of democratic freedoms and liberties which often come off as 
disparaging remarks toward others’ cultural characteristics.  
These statements are met with forceful critiques that it is Western, especially the 
United States’ foreign policies and actions abroad that are important precipitating factors on 
anti-Western terrorism. These critiques attempt to shift the focus from simplistic explanations 
based on cultural stereotypes to those that look to U.S. actions as part of the justification for 
why attackers chose to target the U.S. and its allies. Actions identified as potential causes of 
anti-American terrorism are the historic support for dictatorial heads of state displayed by the 
U.S.; the financing given to foreign governments for military equipment, training, and 
operations; and the stationing of American servicemen in foreign countries. These factors can 
be summarized in the concept of military dependency (Neumayer & Plümper, 2009).  
While currently the battle between these two viewpoints is carried out in the popular 
media between government officials in response to terrorist actions (see speech by G.W. Bush 
2001; Attorney General Eric Holder May 1, 2010), in books by former intelligence officers or 
government officials with firsthand knowledge of America’s actions abroad (see Johnson, 2000, 
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2004, 2007; Scheuer, 2002, 2004),  in descriptive analyses in academic journals by critics of U.S. 
foreign policies (Eland, 2008), and by sometimes by the statements of the terrorists themselves 
(see statements made by Osama bin Laden in 1996 ). What is lacking is an accumulation of 
scientific research on the structural determinants of terrorism (some attempts toward this are 
Neumayer & Plümper, 2009; Robison et al. 2006). This previous research has identified military 
dependency as a partial predictor of terrorism but these studies only examine its potential 
short-term effects. My research has built upon the existing research and I have found that there 
is significant evidence of a cumulative effect of at least 10 years for measures of military 
dependency for all outcomes of terrorism under examination here. Furthermore, these results 
may not always support the findings made by previous analyses examining only the 
contemporaneous effects of military dependency on terrorism. In some cases causes that have 
been previously found to lead to increased terrorism in the short-term do not lead to increased 
terrorism in the long-term and vise-versa. 
Research Questions 
While the topic of my research is complex and most likely multidimensional, I plan to 
focus on the specific aspect of how the degree of military dependency can lead to variation in 
the number of terrorist attacks.  The examination of Western military dependency’s impact on 
terrorism by Robison et al. (2006) and the specific focus on military dependency on the U.S. as 
precipitants of anti-American terrorism by Neumayer & Plümper (2009) is the only research of 
which I am aware that places the concept of military dependency in a primary position in terms 
of its relationship to terrorism. Thus, my strategy is to use these existing studies as starting 
points for my study of the long-term impacts of military dependency.  My primary research 
question is whether long-term military dependency on the U.S. leads to an increase in anti-
American terrorism, holding all other variables constant. Simply stated, I am going to examine 
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whether long-term military dependency on the U.S. leads to an increase in “blowback” on 
Americans. This research question will directly engage research findings by Neumayer & 
Plümper (2009) in their examination of the effects of contemporaneous measures of U.S. 
military dependency on anti-American terrorism and infuse it with the concept of blowback 
made famous by Chalmers Johnson in the book of that title (2000). A second research question 
motivated by Robison et al. (2006) is if the cumulative impact of military dependency on 
terrorism lends itself to a different interpretation as to the similarities found by Robison et al. of 
the factors that lead to Islamist and Leftist terrorism. A tertiary research question is to evaluate 
the combined evidence from these two studies in light of my additional analyses of long-term 
effects of military dependency and come to a conclusion on whether the long-term and short-
term effects of military dependency on terrorism are the same or if they diverge. 
Objectives of Research 
The primary goal of my research is to examine whether existing studies, focused on 
short-term consequences of military dependency on terrorism, are accurate portrayals of the 
long-term consequences of military dependency on terrorism.  The lack of existing agreed upon 
methodologies for the measurement of the long-term impacts will require this paper to examine 
a variety of strategies in search of the best methodology. Therefore, a second purpose of this 
study will be to identify a methodology appropriate for assessing long-term effects that could be 
useful in other social science applications. My third purpose in this study is to infuse two related 
but distinct sub-fields of social science, international relations and the study of social 
movements with critiques of U.S. military policy in current affairs literature. These three 
purposes provide a healthy balance of substantive and methodological aims for this paper. In 
the sections that follow I will exactly replicate the analyses Robison et al. (2006) and Neumayer 
& Plümper (2009) and thus establish a foundation upon which I will build my contribution of 
4 
 
analyzing long-term effects of military dependency. Second, I will define the term “blowback” 
how I will use it in this study and contrast the work of Johnson with the previously mentioned 
studies. Third, I will propose competing methodological strategies for examining long-term, 
cumulative effects. Fourth, I will re-analyze the initial replication models with this alternate 
long-term measure of military dependency. Fifth, these competing measurement strategies will 
be evaluated and the implications of these strategies will be discussed including, sixth, the 
comparison of my findings to the findings in the existing studies. Finally, I will identify some 
unanswered questions which are potential areas for future research in analyzing the link 








II. Literature Review 
The inspiration for my project originates with the work of a Political Scientist, Chalmers 
Johnson, whose ideas have gained significant prominence in the post-September 11th world. I 
acknowledge that the main thesis of Johnson (2000) Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of 
American Empire is much more detailed than the portion on which I focus. In Blowback, Johnson 
challenges U.S. policy-makers and the public at large to re-evaluate America’s role in a post-Cold 
War world that operates in a more diffuse manner than the simple polemic template that 
guided the military policies in the decades after World War II to the early 1990s. Johnson also 
states that some of the countries that have been recipients of U.S. military aid, grants, arms, and 
troops are seen by other people in the world as outright or tacit support for the way in which 
these leaders govern their countries. These various forms of support often can change the 
balance of domestic political power by the mere appearance that a leader has the full backing of 
the U.S. government whether real or imaginary. These injections of international support can 
change the calculations of other members of the government, challengers, and political 
outsiders. Johnson argues that the potential for anti-American blowback can occur when the 
resources needed to consolidate the political supremacy come from the U.S. and not from the 
citizens of the nation-state (Johnson, Chapter 1). I interpret the duration and intensity of 
military dependency on the U.S. by another country to be a vital part of Johnson’s analysis and a 
potential indicator from where anti-American terrorism will originate.  
In work which is consistent with the blowback thesis, Neumayer & Plümper (2009) posit 
that countries heavily dependent on the U.S. militarily are potential hotbeds for terrorism, 
especially anti-American terrorism. As the crux of their argument, they describe a set of 
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processes which are used by politically excluded members of a country’s population beginning 
with the use of anti-American terrorism as a method to win domestic political power. They 
frame all anti-American terrorism as a consequence of the unbalanced state of domestic 
governmental affairs due to the over-ridding effect of a country’s military dependence on the 
U.S. Therefore, anti-American terrorism is utilized by domestic challengers in the hopes of 
driving a wedge between the U.S. and their autocratic leaders and bringing support to their 
cause to unseat the domestic leaders.  Success for the terrorists is identified as when the U.S. 
government restructures its relationship with their domestic government in response to 
overwhelming public pressure to minimize American causalities or by the U.S. government’s 
rational calculation of the negative consequences with the status quo relationship. In this 
scenario, the American public is seen as not having the tolerance for governmental policies that 
place innocent Americans in the crosshairs of the terrorists. This portrayal of Americans is 
described by Pape1 as motivation for suicide terrorists today when they are confronting 
occupying troops. “…Hezbollah’s prominent success in compelling the United States, France, and 
Israel to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists view as their homeland has 
played a major role in encouraging today’s most deadly suicide terrorists” (Pape, 2005: p. 129). 
Eland also states that the deployment of U.S. troops abroad, its support of cruel leaders, and 
unwavering support of Israel are some of the most frequently heard complaints by those that 
have and wish to do the U.S. harm. “Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim 
world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Specifically, Osama bin 
                                                          
1
 In Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Pape specifically points to how the 1983 suicide 
bombings in Beirut, Lebanon led to the withdrawal of American (in 1984), French, and Israeli militaries 
from Lebanon after the coordinated attacks of October, 23, 1983. He later goes on to state however; that 
the U.S. and other democracies have not taken such actions when there has been strategic, economic, or 
ideological underpinnings for troop deployment (Pape, 2005: p. 76).  
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Laden’s biggest gripes are with US-that is, non-Muslim-occupation of Muslim lands and 
meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel” (Eland, 2008, p. 95). 
 In the sociological literature of social movements, a phenomenon described as the 
“Boomerang Pattern” is advanced in the discussion of transnational advocacy by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998).  When democratic channels for claims to be made against a government are 
obstructed and the government is not responsive to public pressure, organizations may reach 
out to the international arena seeking an outside benefactor to put pressure on their 
unresponsive leaders. “When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, 
the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: 
domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring 
pressure on their states from outside” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 12).  In a similar way 
challengers’ use of terrorist violence against Americans to pressure the U.S., the most militarily 
powerful nation in the world, to break the pattern of support to their home government and 
thereby altering the balance of power within the dependent nation. Although this boomerang 
pattern has been identified with NGOs as the domestic actors parallels to existing studies on the 
causes of anti-American terrorism have been identified in the international relations literature.  
Neumayer & Plümper empirically test whether military dependency on the U.S. has an 
effect on anti-American terrorism. Here, military dependency is measured with three indicators: 
1-the ratio of weapons imported from the U.S. in a given year to the total military expenditures 
of that country in a given year; 2- the ratio of the amount of U.S. military aid distributed to the 
total military expenditures of that country in a given year; and 3-the ratio of the number of U.S. 
servicemen stationed in country to the number of domestic military troops. Two different 
measurements of anti-American terrorism are used as their dependent variables: 1-the number 
of terrorist incidents where Americans are the primary target based on the national origin of the 
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perpetrator(s) and 2-the number of Americans killed by terrorist attacks based on the national 
origin of the perpetrator(s).   
One distinct feature in this study is that Neumayer & Plümper consider the nationality of 
the terrorists which targeted Americans rather than the location of where the attacks or killings 
take place. James A. Piazza states that studies which examine the sociopolitical contexts which 
produce terrorism are thus far, an understudied aspect in terrorism studies. “[W]hat has been 
curiously understudied by terrorism scholars [is] the general political environment of the 
country of origin of terrorist perpetrators” (2005: p. 38). He goes on to use the term “supply-
side” when examining “the sociopolitical contexts of groups that engage in suicide terrorism” 
(2008: p. 30).  For Neumayer & Plümper, placing the focus on the nationality of the terrorist 
instead of the location where the terrorist attack occurs allows their theoretical argument, a 
modified “boomerang pattern”, for why Americans will endure more attacks from foreign 
nationals who are citizens of a military dependency of the U.S., to be consistent with the 
measurement of their dependent variables. 
Through the use of regression based techniques appropriate for count data, Neumayer 
& Plümper conclude that there is a positive link between increases in military dependency and 
anti-American terrorism. For the number of terrorist incidents they find military aid and military 
troop dependency are statistically significant predictors while arms dependency is not a 
significant predictor. When evaluating the predictors for the number of Americans killed by 
terrorism all three measures are statistically significant predictors and they rank the three 
measures from highest to lowest as: aid, arms, and troop dependency.   
 Neumayer & Plümper’s study was specifically examining U.S. military dependency and 
its potential terrorist repercussions on Americans but there have been similar arguments made 
for Western military dependency more generally (Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins, 2006).  The 
9 
 
goal of Robison et al.’s study is a test as to whether the current “fourth wave” (see Shughart 
2006) of Islamist terrorism is similar or distinct from the Leftist terrorism witnessed during the 
1960s- 1970s.  Regression-based techniques suitable for count data, negative binomial 
regression models, were used in this study. The dependent variable was the number of attacks 
carried out by those with ideologies determined to be either Islamist or Leftist. The resulting 
coefficients for a variety of key explanatory variables relating to structural conditions theorized 
to lead to terrorism were compared between these ideologies to determine the amount of and 
nature of any similarities. Conceptual theories tested came from prior literature and included 
theories of social disorganization and strain; theories of political order; theories of global order; 
and theories which focus on competing identities or civilizations. In this study, the concept of 
Western military dependence is conceptualized as an indicator of the theoretical perspective of 
global order. Western military dependency is measured with a dummy indicator variable which 
represents the presence of arms sales from a Western nation to a less-developed nation. While 
the main emphasis of this study is on the comparison of the structural characteristics of Islamist 
and Leftist terrorism, they do find that Western military dependency did have a positive and 
significant effect in all models of Islamist terrorism and in preliminary models of Leftist 
terrorism.   
These two studies represent the closest examples in the social science literature that 
link the concepts of military dependency and terrorism. Neumayer & Plümper’s focused solely 
on anti-American terrorist attacks and come closest to the concept of anti-American blowback 
that Johnson examines in his work. They also use three different measures of military 
dependency on the U.S. which relate to dependency on arms imports, military troop 
dependency, and military aid dependency. Robison et al. focus on a less precise measurement of 
Western military dependency and the replication of this study and extension of it using my 
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cumulative measures of military dependency is mainly used as a robustness check on the results 
I obtain from the cumulative extensions of Neumayer & Plümper’s study. Robison et al. include a 
large number of structural theories identified in the current literature that were left out of 
Neumayer & Plümper’s study. 
Both studies base their conclusions solely on the short-term consequences of military 
dependency and leave unexamined the potential cumulative nature that duration or exposure 
to military dependency’s structural arrangements may cause. Any extrapolations based on these 
findings to longer time horizons may bias or misrepresent the true portrayal of the long-term 
consequences of military dependency. This is potentially dangerous because past studies of 
terrorism by social scientists have been used as fodder for the political and foreign policy 
apparatus in the U.S.2 In essence, the danger is that important decisions relating to military 
policy may be made based on assessments of military dependency that are incomplete and may 
belie the true nature of the total costs or true consequences of distributing military support to 
foreign governments. Thus, I intend to take the potential long-term nature of military 
dependency into account to test whether short-term and long-term consequences converge and 
to better represent the concept of blowback used most famously by Johnson which I use as my 
theoretical guide for my analyses.  
If Johnson’s assessment is correct and the U.S. has rung up, in essence, a huge debt of 
blowback potential of which Americans have only begun to feel the reverberations, then the 
anachronous foreign military policies of the U.S. lamented by Johnson may need to be altered to 
decrease the possibility that Americans will be the targets of future blowback. “Throughout the 
world in the wake of the Cold War, official and unofficial U.S. representatives have been acting, 
                                                          
2
 Robert Pape, a Political Science Professor at the University of Chicago, has testified before Congressional 
Subcommittees, written op-ed pieces in mainstream U.S. newspapers such as the New York Times, 
Washington Post, etc., and has made appearances on major news networks such as CNN, related to his 
work on suicide terrorism. 
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often in covert ways to prop up repressive regimes or their militaries and police forces, 
something’s against significant segments of their own populaces. Such policies are likely to 
produce future instances of blowback whose origins, on arrival will seem anything but self-
evident to the American public” (Johnson, 2000: 65).  
The link between America’s arms industry and future potential cases of anti-American 
blowback explicitly links the work of Neumayer & Plümper and Robison et al. to Johnson’s 
assessments of potential cause of future blowback. “Arms sales are, in sort, a major cause of a 
developing blowback world whose price we have yet to begin to pay” (89).  While neither of 
these studies that I am replicating and extending here referenced blowback or Chalmers 
Johnson I feel that this is an important oversight given that Johnson’s work eloquently 
humanizes with historical depth some fascinating and little-known cases (little known in the U.S. 
that is) that show the consequences of U.S. military policies abroad including those relating to 
foreign troop deployment3, military aid (including training), and foreign arms sales which are 
particularly salient for my analysis.   
Most of the examples that Johnson discusses in Blowback play out over a much longer 
time horizon than just one year. One chilling example of blowback used by Johnson (8) is the 
U.S. government’s military alliance with the Afghan mujahedeen rebels fighting against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, especially fighters aligned with Osama bin Laden. Although this 
working relationship was formed in the Cold War of the mid to late 1980s, Johnson cites that 
one of the unintended consequences of this relationship was an increase in the standing of bin 
Laden amongst his fellow fighters and ultimately may have contributed to the anti-American 
terrorist attacks simultaneously at U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
                                                          
3
 I found chapter 2 “Okinawa: Asia’s Last Colony” on Okinawa, Japan to be perhaps the most egregious 
case of anachronous military policies may lead to future incidents of blowback on Americans. 
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on August 7, 19984. If actions of military support by the U.S. are hypothesized to lead to anti-
American terrorist blowback then I would like to attempt to integrate current social science 
studies of military dependency’s effect on terrorism with the theoretical underpinning of 
Johnson’s blowback thesis in my study. 
However, before going any further in my work I would be remiss if I failed to introduce 
an important disclaimer and a couple of problems that I wrestle with concerning Johnson’s 
blowback thesis and the related scholarly work (and my unique contributions that follow). First, 
although the title of Chalmers Johnson’s first book of three on the imperialist tendencies of the 
U.S. was entitled Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of  American Empire, I fully 
acknowledge that Johnson’s thesis and many of his main descriptions and insights went far 
beyond simply blowback, or the unintended consequences of U.S. actions abroad. It would be a 
gross simplification and disservice to this fine work if I were to fail to at least make an attempt 
to acknowledge what I believe to be the main emphasis of this book. If I were to hazard to give a 
two line summation of this book I would say that it is a sobering warning to all Americans of the 
potential consequences of an institutionalized American military apparatus which uses 
seemingly benign ideology, like the support of democracy and freedom abroad, to support often 
anachronous Cold War policies. These policies have the potential to lead the U.S. into a situation 
of imperial overstretch, retaliation from people around the world, and possibly to collapse.  
As a Sociologist I feel obligated to point out what astute students of Sociology will no 
doubly see as a repackaging of a classic sociological debate between the two opposing 
approaches to dividing human actions: the role that social structures play in constraining and 
facilitating human behaviors and attitudes and the role that humans have on shaping the social 
conditions in which they live (Kivisto, 1998: p. 146). I would argue that that Johnson’s blowback 
                                                          
4
 Blowback was written before the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11
th,
 2001 and thus is not 
cited as an example of blowback from Osama bin Laden or al Qaida. 
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thesis could be identified as part of the structuralist approach by the way in which military 
dependency alters for both the power-holders and challengers the political opportunity 
structure (POS) within a political regime5. In terms of POS I rely on the Tilly and Tarrow’s 
definition as “features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s 
collective action”6 (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: p. 203). I acknowledge this debate and view the 
analysis here as but one of many potential factors that lead to human actions. This analysis 
necessarily neglects, without much discussion, the multitude ways in which the citizens of 
militarily dependent countries can shape their realities, identities, cultures, and processes such 
as framing that lie between the structure and the ultimate actions under analysis. 
Another issue in this current debate on blowback is one in which I will call the self-
prophetic feel that the blowback thesis has in my opinion and is another source of my interest in 
this work and the topic in general. In essence, an attempted terrorist attack regardless of its 
success could be construed as evidence for the blowback thesis whether the “true” unknown 
cause of the attack has anything to do with military dependency. This situation is even further 
exasperated when there is no specific time horizon given as guidance in theoretical statements 
on blowback. An extreme example to illustrate my point would be of a terrorist attack against 
American citizens by Panamanian citizens which takes place today in 2010. Using the idea of the 
blowback thesis, I could argue that this attack was retribution for the humiliation suffered by the 
Panamanians for the loss of complete sovereignty to the U.S. of the Panama Canal due to the 
joint Panama-U.S control over the canal for the two decades proceeding the year 2000.  Clearly, 
                                                          
5
 According to Tilly and Tarrow, political regimes are defined as “regular relations among governments, 




 According to Tilly and Tarrow, they are often seen as six properties of regimes: “(1) the multiplicity of 
independent centers of power within it; (2) its openness to new actors; (3) the instability of current 
political alignments; (4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for the challengers; (5) the extent 
to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making; (6) Decisive changes in items 1 to 5” 
(2007: p. 205) 
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this example may appear ridiculous but it illustrates the difficulty one would have in delineating 
the boundaries of the blowback thesis. Regardless of these troubling issues, I will proceed with 
my analyses in much the same way as my predecessors have but I will challenge the reader to 
keep in mind my objections and to devise clever ways which blowback could be better specified. 
As a preliminary step in my analysis, I applied the theoretical insights by Johnson’s 
blowback thesis to Neumayer & Plümper’s data by re-examining some of the qualitative 
descriptions given in the paper. Specifically, I re-ranked the countries examined by Neumayer & 
Plümper from the perspective of a potential long-term effect of military dependency.  First, as 
can be seen in Table 1.1., I made a list of the countries that had produced anti-American 
terrorist attacks in all of the years in their original analysis, 1968 to 2005.  In this table I also 
listed where the country ranked in terms of the three key dependent variables in the original 
analysis. In the table the smaller number in the rank of aid, arms, and troops equates there to 
be a higher degree of dependency on the U.S. for these variables.  In Table 1.2 I show the 
rankings of the top 15 countries which produced terrorists who killed greater number of 
Americans in the period 1978-2005 along with the number of attacks produced by that country 
and the rankings aid, arms, and troops.7  In both of these tables I have indicated with boldface, 
italicized, boxed numbers, the instances where a country who made the list also had a 
corresponding ranking of aid, arms, or troop’s dependency in the top 15. 
Initially, this led me to have some different interpretations than those offered in the 
analysis by Neumayer & Plümper (2009, p. 21). I find that this preliminary evidence does not 
support the theoretical claims as to why Americans would be the targets of attacks and fatal 
attacks in the long-term.  Similarly, it is not clear to me from Tables 1.1 and 1.2 that there is a 
clear pattern that suppliers of anti-American terrorism are more militarily dependent than other 
                                                          
7
 The Iterate data set did not specifically begin keeping track of the number of Americans killed by 
terrorist attacks until 1978 while the number of terrorist attacks began to be recorded in 1978. 
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countries. This may be preliminary evidence that the short-term and long-term effects of 
military dependency on the U.S. are divergent. This initial descriptive analysis provides further 
Table 1.1 Top 15 Countries that Produce Anti-













1 Colombia 188 35 25 81 
2 Philippines 85 18 24 5 
3 Greece 59 16 10 22 
4 Turkey 58 11 7 31 
5 El Salvador 51 37 67 65 
5 Lebanon 51 9 19 48 
7 Peru 45 74 52 96 
8 Iran 43 65 11 73 
9 Germany 41 172 69 3 
10 Pakistan 39 41 45 107 
11 Somalia 34 27 82 93 
12 South Korea 32 4 8 8 
13 Cuba 29 148 167 23 
14 Chile 26 72 55 84 
15 Iraq 25 134 124 10 
 
Table 1.2 Top 15 Countries that Produce Terrorists who 












1 Lebanon 272 51 9 19 48 
2 Germany 202 41 172 69 3 
3 Saudi Arabia 57 24 71 29 18 
4 Iraq 36 25 134 124 10 
5 El Salvador  20 51 37 67 65 
6 Philippines 19 85 18 24 5 
7 Egypt 13 16 5 4 52 
8 Colombia 12 188 35 25 81 
8 Pakistan 12 39 41 45 107 
8 Turkey 12 58 11 7 31 
11 Jordan 10 17 8 2 100 
12 Iran 9 43 65 11 73 
12 Indonesia 9 12 41 53 106 
14 India 8 14 97 97 133 
15 Afghanistan 7 8 81 . 15 




evidence, along with theoretical statements, that better identifying the long-term effects of 
military dependency is an important undertaking to pursue in this paper.  Before continuing any 
further in this endeavor I will next discuss the concept of long-term effects and identify and 
briefly describe the multiple methodologies I use to attempt to capture these duration effects. 
Initially, this led me to have some different interpretations than those offered in the 
analysis by Neumayer & Plümper (2009, p. 21). I find that this preliminary evidence does not 
support the theoretical claims as to why Americans would be the targets of attacks and fatal 
attacks in the long-term.  Similarly, it is not clear to me from Tables 1.1 and 1.2 that there is a 
clear pattern that suppliers of anti-American terrorism are more militarily dependent than other 
countries. This may be preliminary evidence that the short-term and long-term effects of 
military dependency on the U.S. are divergent. This initial descriptive analysis provides further 
evidence, along with theoretical statements, that better identifying the long-term effects of 
military dependency is an important undertaking to pursue in this paper.  Before continuing any 
further in this endeavor I will next discuss the concept of long-term effects and identify and 







III. Long-Term or Cumulative Effects 
The theoretical literature from Johnson yields the insight of the potential effects of military 
dependency to differ due to the duration or intensity in which the dependency is experienced.  
However, the theoretical literature does not hint to any specific type of empirical model which could 
capture the ideas of duration and intensity of military dependency.  To capture these ideas appropriated 
from Johnson, I will use the six methods shown in Table 3.1 to formulate the long-term nature of the 
relationship between military dependency and terrorism. I formally define long-term or cumulative 
effects as a situation where an explanatory variable’s effect is experienced for a duration lasting 
between 5 and 30 years.  Although this definition allows for a large variance in potential duration, I 
hypothesize that I will find that the largest effects of military dependency to lie between 10 to 20 years. 
My justification of this range is that there is face validity to the idea that this would be the amount of 
time it would take a child who could comprehend potential influences of military dependency either 
directly or from stories by an elder to the time where the adult could act on this stimulus. A time span of 
shorter than that may not be enough to allow for enough young children to grow up and act on these 
feelings in numbers large enough to be seen as statistically significant. Similarly, a time span larger than 
20 years would reach into one’s late twenties to early thirties when most likely they have adopted a 
more conservative nature and have responsibilities such as families and careers that may not be 
desirable to cast aside to act on long-held grievances. Therefore, I would hypothesize that any radical 
behavior leading to terrorism would have manifested itself before a lag of thirty years. In the sections 
which follow, I will briefly describe each method I use to capture duration.8  
 
                                                          
8
 More detailed descriptions of these methodologies are located in the appendices. 
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Table 3.1 Methodologies 
Capturing Long-Term Effects 
Methodology 
Running Sum Model 
Unrestricted DL Model 
Arithmetic DL Model 
Polynomial DL Model 
Long-Term Interaction 
Growth Curve Model 
 
Running Sum Model 
This method consists of creating a new explanatory variable for each existing measure of 
military dependency that is a running sum of each of its previous values. These three cumulative 
variables are essentially a running sum from the first year of data given in the data set. Missing values 
for a given year were dealt with by carrying forward the value from the previous year9.  All other 
variables in the model are held at the same level as all previous models. This method has the potential 
drawback in that it does not include measures of military dependency which occurred prior to the first 
year contained in a dataset. If my theory of cumulating effects is correct, influence from unmeasured 
prior years will likely influence my estimates in ways that are not known. The following is the equation 
used for creating the running sum X ’p  (i.e., X prime sub-p). Each predictor variable is denoted Xp , the 
subscript 0 refers to the current value of the predictor variable, k is the number of lags being tested, and 
p refers to the number of explanatory variables which are all shown in Equation 1.1.  
                                           
 
  (1.1) 
  
                                                          
9
 I also replicated the models by replacing the running sum variable with a missing value when its corresponding 
independent variable was missing. The results, although for slightly fewer cases did not change the interpretation 
of the models in any case. 
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Distributed Lag (DL) Models – Unrestricted/Restricted and Infinite/Finite Variations 
I will briefly define the term distributed lag (DL) and discuss two general types of divisions that 
can be imposed on DL models which will lay the foundation for several of the methods used below. Rao 
and Miller state that “[In a] causal relation-in which the influence of a change in the independent 
variable is spread over a long stretch of time periods [it] is called the distributed lag effect” (Rao and 
Miller, 1971: p. 160). DLs are common in the study of econometrics in such evaluations of the link 
between changes in the money supply and consumer prices, the lag between research and development 
expenditures and their impact on productivity, in the relationship between the balance of trade among 
nations and a currency’s depreciation, etc. (Gujarati, 2004: pp. 660-661). One dimension of DL Models 
can be viewed as the distinction between two types: 1-Unrestricted and 2-Restricted. The term 
restricted refers to whether there is any type of shape or pattern that is introduced into the coefficients 
on the variables being examined. By introducing a pattern into the time profile of the lagged values, the 
coefficients for each of the values (present and lagged) have to be restricted to a pre-defined value. The 
unrestricted variants of these models are straight forward and include additional terms of the right-hand 
side (RHS) of the equation which correspond to past values of the independent variable(s) being 
examined. Often in practice, these unrestricted models break down and are generally not practical as 
the number of lagged variables increases. Another disadvantage of these models is that for each 
additional lagged value included in the model there is a cost of one degree of freedom that is imposed. 
As the number of degrees of freedom decrease, the ability to detect the desired effect of the 
independent variable decreases. This is equivalent to stating that the statistical power of the test is 
decreasing with each additional lagged value. An additional problem is of the unrestricted DLs is that the 
collinearity between lags can often be a source of estimation problems. 
A Restricted Distributed Lag Model is one where the coefficients on the lagged values of the 
independent variables on the RHS of the equation follow some sort of predefined pattern. These 
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patterns are possible for two reasons. The X-variables are linearly transformed into Z-variables and the 
beta coefficients are not directly estimated but indirectly estimated through gamma coefficient of the Z-
variables. The number of gamma parameters estimated varies depending on the type of finite DL model 
being estimated. An advantage of these models is that substantial increases in degrees of freedom can 
be achieved through the need to estimate only a few gamma parameters from which the beta 
parameters can be computed by the functional form of the time profile chosen a priori. 
Another way in which DL models can be conceptually categorized is by whether they are finite 
or infinite. Finite lags refer to the situation where the researcher specifies a priori the number of lagged 
values to include in the statistical model.  Infinite DL models are usually estimated via the Koyck 
transformation. My theoretical guidance does not suggest these models may be appropriate so I will not 
elaborate on them here (see a standard econometric text such as Gujarati, 2004: pp. 665-667, for the 
exact details of the Koyck transformation). 
Unrestricted Distributed Lag Model 
The unrestricted distributed lag model is described as an ad hoc estimation practice of DLs 
(Gujarti, 2004: p. 663). This type of DL model is what is often used by researchers in social sciences, 
applied econometrics, advertising, environmental studies amongst other disciplines, especially when the 
suspected lag length is small. One way to employ this method is to use an iterative strategy for the 
determination of the number of lagged values of the independent variable to include on the RHS of the 
model.  This procedure is discussed further in Appendix B.  Equation 2.1 is the general DL regression 
equation for a single predictor X.  
                                               (2.1) 
Context of Restricted Distributed Lag Models 
As stated above, restricted DL models estimate a smaller number of gamma coefficients for Z-
variables which are linear transformations of the X-variables.  Along with the gamma coefficients the 
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coefficient pattern linking the time profile to the beta parameters can be used to recover the individual 
beta coefficient. The Arithmetic DL (ArDL) model requires the estimation of only one gamma coefficient 
regardless of the number of lagged values included in the model. Higher order functional forms require 
additional gamma parameters.  
Arithmetic Distributed Lag (ArDL) Model 
The structure of the lags is linearly decreasing beginning with the current value of the X-variable 
through the first lag to the kth lag. The estimation of this type of finite lag structure requires that the 
researcher start with a pre-determined lag length that they would like to explore (k) and from this 
known value of k only one unknown parameter gamma (γ) is needed to compute the values for all of the 
betas (β) for each of the lagged X-variables. The intercept term and disturbance are estimated as alpha 
(α) and epsilon (ε) respectively. 
                 (3.1) 
For illustration purposes, assume a lag length of 10 and an estimated value of gamma of 0.2 
from Equation 3.1 above. This results in a graphical representation of the size of the effect for each 
lagged value of the X-variable, a time profile. The hypothetical values suggested above result in the time 
profile shown in Graph 3.1. On a time profile, the number of lags is displayed on the x-axis while the 
values of the lagged X-variables are shown on the y-axis. Through the use of a time profile it is easy to 
see that each X-variable has more influence on the current outcome than the previous lagged values. 
The influence of these lags decreases in a linear manner until a point where the kth +1 lag has no effect 
on the current value of the outcome variable. Appendix D. and provides a detailed step-by-step 




Graph 3.1 Normalized Time Profile for ArDL Model 
 
 
Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Models 
The finite restricted DL model known as the Almon or Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) models 
allows for more influence of some past explanatory variables than others. In the PDL models, the 
coefficients on the lags are still related to each other but in a different way than in the arithmetic lag 
models which is not uniform. This lag structure is often used when the linearly decreasing structure in 
the arithmetic lags is too restrictive. The additional second and third gamma parameters are used to 
estimate the slope of the time profile and the apex, or the lag which has the maximum effect on the 
current outcome variable. In the visual representation of a PDL2 model shown in Graph 4.1, the 
distributed lags has a time profile that increases initially and then begins to decrease to 0 producing 
what can be identified as a hump shape with a maximum at lag one. Equation, 4.1, is solved for the 
alpha (α) and gamma parameters (γ) in a way which is similar to the ArDL model.  
                                 (4.1) 
Then, as in the ArDL model, the estimated parameters are used to recover the beta coefficients 
for each lagged value of the X-variable following Table E.1 in Appendix E as well as the details of a step-
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Graph 4.1 Normalized Time Profile for Second Degree PDL Model 
 
The PDL model can be extended to an even more nuanced function form, the PDL3 model, 
having four unknown gamma parameters. The additional parameter is used to give an additional bend 
or change of direction in the time profile of the lagged X-values. The following equation produces the 
gamma coefficients which can be used to recover the individual beta coefficients following the steps 
outlined in Appendix F. 
                                       (4.2) 
Long-Term Interaction (LTI) Model 
Another potential method for estimating long-term effects is to include an interaction with a 
variable that measures long-term military dependency on the U.S. I constructed a dichotomous indicator 
variable with a value of one when a country hosted 100 or more U.S. servicemen in a given year and 
zero when it did not. The impetus for using this measure was taken from Johnson’s second book in the 
Blowback trilogy, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. In Nemesis, Johnson discusses that 
the annual BSR prepared by the U.S. DoD lists each domestic and overseas property that the DoD owns 
or leases each year. These listing by themselves give us only a partial indication as to the size of the U.S. 
footprint in that country. These records describe in detail the real-estate holdings and list characteristics 
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that country. The installation listed could be just a listening post with one or two personnel working 
there or a larger military installation. Johnson suggested that looking at installations that house 100 or 
more troops would give an accurate depiction as to whether that facility represented an American 
military presence.  Since the BSR does list the number of servicemen and women that occupy that 
facility in any given year I used a data set prepared by a fellow at the Heritage Foundation Timothy Kane. 
He prepared a data set that takes official DoD records and created time series variable for the number of 
troops in a country each year. From this data I created a dichotomous indicator variable with a value of 
one when a country hosted 100 or more U.S. servicemen in a given year and taking a value of zero when 
the country hosted less than 100. 
From this dichotomous indicator variable I then created a variable containing the running sum 
variable, a variable that holds the value of the number of years since 1968 that there have been 100 or 
more U.S. troops stationed in country. This variable was then included in the NBRM by itself and also 
interacted with each of the three military dependency variables, in the first analysis and with the lone 
measure of military dependency in the second analysis.  
Growth Curve Model (GCM) 
For this study I will use GCMs in the SEM framework called Latent Curve Models (LCMs) (Bollen 
and Curran, 2006: p. xi).There are several advantages of LCMs for estimating GCMs: 1-their ability to 
deal with imperfectly measured variables through the incorporation of measurement models (see Blozis, 
2004; Hancock, Kuo, & Lawrence, 2001; McArdle, 1988); 2-their ability to deal with missing data on the 
outcome and the predictor variables by using direct maximum likelihood (see McArdle, Grimm, 
Hamagami, Bowles, & Meredith, 2009; McArdle & Hamagami, 2004); 3-overall fit statistics that can be 
used to judge differences between estimated models and function as stand-alone measures of overall 
model fit (e.g., CFI, TLI, IFI, RMSEA); and 4-group models can be estimated with a priori or posteriori 
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(mixture models) grouping variables (Ram & Grimm, 2009); and 5-making the leap from unconditional to 





IV. Replications and Testing Cumulative Effects 
My first task in building on the existing studies indicating that military dependency is a 
significant predictor of terrorism is to replicate the two studies that I will be using as a starting point for 
my original analysis.  I will first replicate and discuss Neumayer & Plümper’s (2009), “Foreign Terrorism 
on Americans”. Next, I will replicate and briefly discuss Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins’s (2006), 
“Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism”.  Once I have 
established that my replication analyses produce the exact results by their original authors I will change 
only one aspect of each of these works, namely, substituting new measures that I will create utilizing the 
methods outlined above for the existing measures of military dependency. This procedure will be the 
source of the evidence that I will use to make my conclusions. 
Replication: “Foreign Terrorism on Americans” 
Neumayer & Plümper frame the argument as to why the U.S. is frequently the target of 
international terrorism as attacks on Americans are strategic actions. This means that a group or 
network of subjects from a country militarily dependent on the U.S. comes to the conclusion that 
attacking Americans is of more strategic value than pursuing some other course of action with the goal 
of obtaining some political power. The real value for the terrorists is in the damage that their attack may 
ultimately inflict on the nature of the relationship with their dependent government and the U.S. In this 
study they use the country-level as the unit of analysis. I use in my replication the exact same variables 
that were used by Neumayer & Plümper in their original work and I present them concisely in Table 4.01 
below along with their relevant statistical summaries presented in Table 4.02.10 The dependent variables 
are the number of attacks on Americans and the number of Americans killed in terrorist incidents 
                                                          
10
 A full description on these variables is found on pages 17-19 of the original work. 
27 
 
outside the U.S. The key independent variables are U.S. military aid expressed as a % of total domestic 
military expenditures, military weaponry purchased from the U.S. expressed as a % of total domestic 
military expenditures, the ratio of U.S. military troops to domestic military troops. The remainder of the 
variables in the table population, distance between capital cities, GDP per capita, and level of democracy 
are used as control variables.  
Table 4.01 Description of Variables Used and Sources in Neumayer & Plümper Replication 
Models 
Variable Description of Variable Source(s) 
Number of Anti-American 
Attacks the # of attacks on Americans outside of the U.S. Iterate 
Number of Americans Killed  
the # of Americans killed in terrorist incidents outside 
the U.S. Iterate 
LN Population Natural Log of the size of the population World Bank 
LN Distance 
Natural Log of the distance between Capital City and 
Washington D.C. Bennett & Stam (2005) 
LN GDP/per capita Natural Log of GDP/per capita World Bank 
Democracy Level of Democracy ranging from -10 to 10 
Polity IV, Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 
(2006) 
Military Aid Dependency 
U.S. military aid expressed as a % of total military 
expenditures 
USAID Greenbook, COW-Military 
Capabilities  
Military Arms Dependency 
Military Weaponry Purchased from the U.S. expressed 
as a % of total military expenditures SIPRI, COW-Military Capabilities  
Military Troops Dependency 
Ratio of U.S. military troops to domestic military 
troops 












Table 4.02 Descriptive Statistics and Variables in the Replication 
Model 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Number of Anti-American Attacks 3341 0.31 2.01 0.00 90.00 
Number of Americans Killed  3341 0.07 0.66 0.00 19.00 
LN Population 3341 16.09 1.47 12.72 20.99 
LN Distance 3341 8.39 1.15 0.00 9.15 
LN GDP/per capita 3341 7.40 1.59 3.80 10.75 
Democracy 3341 1.63 7.35 -10.00 10.00 
Military Aid Dependency 3341 3.23 15.57 0.00 646.46 
Military Arms Dependency 3341 2.67 9.53 0.00 305.89 
Military Troops Dependency 3341 1.42 7.66 0.00 114.33 
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Dependent Variable: Anti-American Attacks 
The results from my replication models of the number of anti-American terrorist attacks are 
shown in Table 4.03. Following the original work, four models are estimated with the dependent 
variable anti-American attacks.11 In the full model with all of the predictors, model 4, only military aid 
dependency and troop dependency are statistically significant predictors of the number of anti-
American terrorist attacks. Although the variable arms dependency is significant in preliminary model 2, 
it is not significant in the full model. I will report here both the unstandardized value appearing in the 
table above with their standard errors in parentheses and the standardized coefficients to be consistent 
with later models since time profiles of different variables can be compared directly if they are 
normalized (Rao and Miller, 1971, p. 163).  The coefficient for aid dependency is .038 (.0138) and for 
troops dependency is 0.027 (0.0058). The standardized coefficient for aid dependency is 1.165 (0.597) 
the standardized coefficient for arms dependency is 1.615 (1.05) and for troops dependency is 1.48 
(0.312). The conclusion is that increases in military aid and troop dependency lead to increases in anti-
American attacks. Taking this finding as my starting point, I then proceeded to estimate these same four 
models but substituting three cumulative, long-term measures of military dependency for the three 
contemporaneous measures of military dependency in the original models. Listed in Appendix G are the 
descriptive summary statistics for all of the variables that I created to use in each of the long-term 
models. 
Based on the long-term models that I analyzed I have come to some conclusions based when 
examining the number of anti-American attacks. These observations are summarized in table 4.05 
below. The running sum model presents evidence that appears to be contradictory to the replication 
model as well as other long-term models. It suggests that only military arms dependency is a significant 
                                                          
11
 Each of the first three models includes the control variables and one of the key IVs (aid in model one, arms in 
model two, and troops in model three). The full model is the fourth model which includes all three military 
dependency measures along with the control variables. 
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predictor of the outcome. Due to its contradictory analysis I tend to think that this model does not 
present an accurate representation of the long-term effects of military dependency. The unrestricted DL 
model appears to break down when attempting to include only two lagged values of the military  
Table 4.03 Neumayer & Plümper NBRM Replication of Anti-
American Terrorist Incidents, 1968-2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN Population 0.668*** 0.617*** 0.645*** 0.677*** 
 
(5.13) (4.43) (4.52) (5.18) 
LN Distance -0.103 -0.188 -0.215 -0.058 
 
(-0.23) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.17) 
LN GDP per capita 0.154 0.066 0.076 0.083 
 
(1.48) (0.61) (0.67) (0.75) 
Democracy -0.001 0.010 0.006 0.002 
 




















   
(3.15) (4.74) 
Intercept -12.766*** -10.522** -10.743** -12.899*** 
 
(-3.48) (-2.29) (-2.19) (-4.17) 
Dispersion Parameter 2.219*** 2.269*** 2.269*** 2.178*** 
 
(16.98) (17.78) (16.91) (16.03) 
N 3360 3360 3483 3341 
chi2 47.48*** 40.91*** 38.63*** 84.79*** 
n2ll 1765.98 1779.53 1802.06 1749.39 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
dependency explanatory variables. I followed the procedures suggested by Gujarti for ad hoc estimation 
of this model and found the ideal lag length for each explanatory variable independently. However, the 
full model led to inconsistent results in terms of the coefficients and the sign of the coefficients when 
two or more lagged values of the military dependency variable were included in the model despite the 
fact that in individual models a lag length of two was appropriate. This is indeed one of the weaknesses 
of this methodology and I took it as a suggestion to move forward to restricted lag models. 
Having been unimpressed with the results from either the running sum or the unrestricted DL 
models I turned to the estimation of restricted lag models. I first started with arithmetic distributed lag 
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models (ArDL) and began the examination to find the proper length of lagged explanatory variables to 
include in the model. The analytical procedures call for estimating several lengths of lags and rely on 
empirical fit statistics to assess a potential length of lag to use.  I found this procedure to produce 
inconclusive results at times and realized quickly some limitations with this approach. Beyond the fact 
that this felt like exploratory modeling the amount of available data appears to be a major limitation of 
this approach, as it is for other DL models I examine below. I found that overall fit measures consistently 
identified 20-years as the most appropriate lag length when the variables were assessed individually. 
However, when all three explanatory variables were included in the model the 10-year lag lengths led to 
the outcome that had the largest overall effect on the number of anti-American terrorist attacks. Each of 
the measures of military dependency was statistically significant and the gamma coefficients were as 
follows:  aid dependency was 0.058, for arms dependency 0.104, and 0.045 for military troop 
dependency. To clarify, these gamma coefficients estimated in the model are not directly comparable to 
typical standardized beta coefficients in regression-based methods which by convention are usually 
denoted X-variables. These gamma coefficients are for newly created Z-Variables which are linear 
combinations of the original X-variables based on the lag scheme specific to the method being used 
here, the ArDL approach for working with DLs. After the model is estimated the resulting gamma 
coefficients are used to recover the familiar standardized beta coefficients for the X-variables and each 
of the 10 lagged values used in this model to compute the total effect of the explanatory variable. Once I 
recovered these standardized beta coefficients using Table D.1 in Appendix D I determined the total 
effect of each of the military dependency variables over the 10-year period identified as the most 
appropriate length of lag which were: 3.828 for aid, 6.824 for arms, and 2.97 for military troop 
dependency. Having found this method to produce the best results they are listed in Table 4.04. 
The coefficients of the long-term model compared to the original short-term model are 
approximately 228% larger for military aid dependency and 107.6% larger for military troop 
31 
 
dependency. From the procedure described above and outlined explicitly in Appendix D, the resulting 
exponential of the long-term effects for the significant effects of aid is 45.97, for arms is 957.19, and for 
troops is 19.49. Military arms dependency was not a significant predictor of anti-American terrorism in  
Table 4.04 10-Year ArDL for Anti-American Attacks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN Population 0.637*** 0.570*** 0.604*** 0.635*** 
 
(4.77) (4.08) (4.12) (4.71) 
LN Distance -0.075 -0.127 -0.172 -0.055 
 
(-0.20) (-0.28) (-0.31) (-0.18) 
LN GDP per capita 0.124 -0.044 0.071 -0.011 
 
(1.18) (-0.39) (0.64) (-0.10) 
Democracy 0.004 0.028 0.008 0.016 
 
(0.15) (1.16) (0.35) (0.62) 
10-Year Z for Std. Military 





















   
(2.51) (4.35) 
Intercept -12.347*** -9.718** -10.362** -11.771*** 
 
(-3.69) (-2.52) (-2.33) (-3.96) 
Dispersion Parameter 2.185*** 2.180*** 2.235*** 2.102*** 
 
(16.18) (16.39) (16.76) (14.62) 
N 2902 2902 3179 2867 
chi2 34.63*** 33.16*** 28.76*** 69.71*** 
n2ll 1633.30 1634.59 1756.09 1606.43 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***  p<0.01 
    
the short-term but in the long-term it is a quite strong predictor. Clearly, the long-term effects are 
divergent from the short-term effects especially considering the long-term effect of military arms 
dependency. This suggests that a failure to consider the long-term impacts of military dependency 
would lead to an inaccurate understanding of the causes of anti-American attacks in the long-term. 
When I examined the PDL2 or Almon models for anti-American terrorist attacks, the length of 
lags that appeared to produce the largest effects were those of 5-year lags. However, only the 
standardized military aid dependency variable had a statistically significant coefficient of 0.043. This is a 
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much smaller effect than found in the ArDL model and is not consistent with that model’s findings. The 
third degree PDL model had 10-year lags as the most appropriate length but again, their effects were 
smaller than the ArDL models but larger than the PDL2 models. Of the restricted DL models the ArDL 
model with a 10-year length of lag has the largest effect on the number of anti-American terrorist 
attacks.  
The next model that I evaluated was that of the long-term interaction with a substantial number 
of U.S. troops stationed in a foreign country. Johnson suggested that looking at installations that house 
100 or more troops would give an accurate depiction as to whether that facility represented an 
American military presence. From this dichotomous indicator variable I then created a variable 
containing the running sum variable, a variable that holds the value of the number of years since 1968 
that there were a substantial number of U.S. troops stationed in country. The results from these models 
do have statistically significant effects for aid 0.026, arms 0.034, and troops, 0.028 but they do not show 
evidence of an interaction effect with the number of years in which there is a substantial number of U.S. 
troops stationed in a foreign country. Therefore, in my opinion these results are inferior to those found 
in the 10-Year ArDL models.  
I found the growth curve model to be inappropriate when examining the long-term effects of 
military dependency on anti-American terrorist attacks. This model did not have a statistically significant 
amount of variation about the mean of the number of attacks and thus had a flat latent trajectory. This 
conclusion was established by examining the estimated means of the number of attacks in the model 
and by the lack of significance variance of the mean in the output. 
Overall, I conclude that there is evidence of a long-term effect of military dependency of 
approximately ten years that lead to an increase in the likelihood of anti-American terrorist attacks over 
the short-term effects. I suspect that the running sum model, the long-term interaction model, and the 
GCM evaluated lengths of time much longer than 10-years and may have obscured the impact of the 10-
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year ArDL in much the same way that the short-term models have. To summarize, there is evidence of a 
10-year cumulative long-term effect which is more pronounced than the short-term effect and found on 
all three indicators of military dependency than the original replication model using the dependent 
variable of anti-American attacks. 








of this type 
Results from best-fitting 
model of this type 
Key substantive interpretation from the 








There is evidence of an effect 
of aid and troop military 
dependency on the outcome. 
Military dependent countries are more likely to 
have citizens which attack Americans using 
terrorism especially when the ratio of aid and 





There is evidence of an effect 
of only arms military 
dependency on the outcome. 
In contrast to the replication model, dependency 
on military arms is the only significant predictor of 
the outcome. These results suggest that in the 
long-term the most important predictor of anti-
American attacks is arms and military aid and U.S. 





Inconsistent due to the 
modeling procedure breaking 
down. 
This method appeared to present inconsistent 
results in terms of the coefficients and the sign of 
the coefficients when two or more lagged values 
of the military dependency variable were included 
in the model despite the fact that in individual 
models a lag length of two was appropriate. 
Suggests moving to restricted lag models. 






There is evidence of an effect 
of all military dependency 
variables aid, arms, and 
troops. 
Ranking the measures of military dependency 
from this method in terms of their largest impact 
on the outcome, Arms sales, Military Aid, and U.S. 
troop dependency.  The replication model had 
troops and aid as the two most important 
predictors while the running sum model had only 
arms as a predictor, but here arms is by far the 
largest predictor but not the only statistically 




Only the 5-year PDL has any 
statistically significant  
measures of military 
dependency and that is aid 
Although there was evidence of statistically 
significant positive effects of military dependency 
in the long-term when considered individually, 
when all of the military dependency variables are 
included in the model there is no evidence of a 
long-term effect with the second degree 
polynomial distributed lag models. 
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Polynomial DL 3 
Model (PDL3M) 
Inconsistent 
Based on empirical standards, 
the 10-Year lags appear to be 
appropriate. 
There is a positive effect of aid and troops in the 
long-term but this effect is smaller than is found 
in the ArDL models rendering these models to be 
inferior to those and suggesting that the shape of 
the impulse response function to not be complex. 







There is evidence of an effect 
of troops and aid military 
dependency on the outcome 
and there is no evidence of an 
interaction effect with a short-
term U.S. military presence. 
Consistent with the replication model in that 
troops and aid are the most important predictors 
of anti-American attacks. However, arms 
dependency is found to have a slightly negative 
effect on the outcome whereas in the replication 
model it was not significant. There is not a short-
term interaction with having a U.S. military 







There is evidence of an effect 
of troops and aid on the 
outcome but no indication of 
an interaction with having a 
long-term U.S. military 
presence. 
Consistent with the replication model in that 
troops and aid are the most important predictors 
of anti-American attacks. However, arms 
dependency is found to have a slightly negative 
effect on the outcome whereas in the replication 





Proved inappropriate for the 
attack data.  
Model is not appropriate for the data at hand due 
to the non-significant variation around the mean 
of the number of Americans killed 
 
Dependent Variable: Americans Killed in Terrorist Attacks 
The first step in examining potential long-term effects of military dependency on the number of 
Americans killed in terrorist attacks was to undertake an exact replication with the exact variables as 
were used in the original analysis. Notice from Table 4.06 that all three measures of military dependency 
are statistically significant predictors of the number of American killed in terrorist attacks. Listing these 
variables with the larger coefficients (along with their standard errors) of military dependency first is aid 
at 0.049 (0.2303), next is arms at 0.039 (0.0213), and finally troops with an effect of 0.034 (0.0058). I will 
also include, as I did above, the standardized coefficients which will be used for comparison with the DL 
models: aid 2.115 (0.8802), arms 2.616 (1.436), and troops 1.855 (0.3120).  
Once the replication was established to be identical, I then proceeded with the long-term 
models of the number of Americans killed as I had done above, summarizing my findings in Table 4.07. 
35 
 
To cut to the gist of my findings, the running sum model, the unrestricted DL models, the Long-term 
interaction models and the growth curve models appear to have limitations  
Table 4.06 Neumayer & Plümper NBRM Replication of Americans Killed in Terrorist 
Attacks, 1978-2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN Population 0.707*** 0.612*** 0.645*** 0.746*** 
 
(4.64) (4.20) (4.18) (4.89) 
LN Distance 0.098 0.028 -0.034 0.126 
 
(0.73) (0.12) (-0.10) (1.05) 
LN GDP per capita 0.177 0.064 0.112 0.102 
 
(0.99) (0.39) (0.67) (0.55) 
Democracy -0.078** -0.061* -0.071** -0.087** 
 




















   
(3.25) (5.95) 
Intercept -16.811*** -13.810*** -13.962*** -17.347*** 
 
(-4.24) (-3.33) (-2.67) (-4.26) 
Dispersion Parameter 3.561*** 3.657*** 3.695*** 3.540*** 
 
(12.78) (13.55) (12.87) (12.98) 
N 3360 3360 3483 3341 
chi2 30.32*** 38.80*** 25.32*** 60.97*** 
n2ll 549.05 554.45 563.96 539.39 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
which prevent them from being considered as the best depictions of the long-term effects of military 
dependency in this circumstance. Also, both the second and third degree PDL models do not appear 
appropriate for this data. This leaves the analysis with the ArDL model of 20-year lag length which is the 
most appropriate for modeling the outcome which are presented in Table 4.08. The gamma coefficients 
for these effects are 0.019 for aid, 0.001 but not significant for arms, and 0.012 for troop dependency. 
Remember that these are not standardized beta coefficients on the actual variables but gamma 
coefficients on Z-variables which are linear combinations of the X- variables. Therefore, these estimated 
gamma coefficients have to be used to recover the corresponding standardized beta coefficients and 
then these are summed over the 21-year span to assess their total effects using Table D.1 in Appendix D. 
This procedure yields the total of the 21 standardized beta coefficients to equal an effect of 4.389 for 
aid, 0.231 for arms that is not significant, and troops has a total effect of 2.772.  
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description of this 
type 
Results from best-fitting 
model of this type 
Key substantive interpretation from the 




Plümper 's original 
model specification 
There is evidence of an 
effect of all three military 
dependency variables on the 
outcome. 
Military dependent countries are more 
likely to have citizens which attack 
Americans using terrorism especially when 






There is evidence of an 
effect of only arms military 
dependency on the 
outcome. 
Dependency on military arms is a significant 
predictor of Americans killed in terrorist 
attacks in the short-term and long-term. 
These results suggest that in the long-term 
arms and military aid and U.S. troops are 
not significant predictors. 
Unrestricted DL 
Model (UDL) 
2-Year Lags Inconsistent 
This method appeared to present 
inconsistent results in terms of the 
coefficients and the sign of the coefficients 
when two or more lagged values of the 
military dependency variable were included 
in the model despite the fact that in 
individual models a lag length of two was 
appropriate. Suggests moving to restricted 
lag models. 





There is evidence for military 
aid and U.S. troops being 
significant predictors of the 
number of Americans killed 
by terrorist attacks.  
This model is not consistent with the 
replication model, or the short term model 
because the level of arms exports is not 




Only evidence of aid at the 
10-year lag length. 
This model does not appear to fit the data 
that well. 
Polynomial DL 3 
Model (PDL3) 
15-Year 
Only evidence of aid at the 
15-year lag length. 
This model does not appear to fit the data 
that well. 






There is evidence of an 
effect of only troops on the 
outcome, no real short-term 
interaction with having a U.S. 
military presence. 
This finding is inconsistent with the 
replication model in that only troops is an 
important predictor of Americans killed in 
terrorist attacks. There is no evidence of a 
short-term interaction with having a 








There is evidence of an 
effect of all three military 
dependency variables on the 
outcome. 
Arms have the largest effect but it is 
conditional on the number of years that 
there has been a U.S. military presence 
because its interaction is negative. In cases 
with many years of a U.S. military presence 
this effect can be completely attenuated 
and troops and aid have the greatest effect. 
Troops have a very larger potential for 
affecting the number of Americans killed. 
Conclude that troops are the key variable 
here and that this is consistent with 







Model is not appropriate for the data at 
hand due to the non-significant variation 
around the mean of the number of 
Americans killed 
 
Table 4.08 20-Year ArDL Models for Americans Killed in Terrorist 
Attacks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN Population 0.736*** 0.519*** 0.650*** 0.874*** 
 
(3.40) (2.81) (3.56) (4.71) 
LN Distance 0.287 0.179 0.152 0.374 
 
(1.31) (0.91) (0.66) (1.24) 
LN GDP per capita 0.205 -0.084 0.027 0.139 
 
(1.20) (-0.43) (0.13) (0.71) 
Democracy -0.119*** -0.091** -0.096** -0.137*** 
 
-2.62) (-2.14) (-2.37) (-3.01) 
















20-Year Std. Military Troops 
  
0.010*** 0.012*** 










(-3.76) (-2.65) (-3.04) (-4.26) 
Dispersion Parameter 3.572*** 3.723*** 3.769*** 3.521*** 
 
11.77) (11.60) (11.39) (11.88) 
N 1540 1540 1733 1505 
chi2 17.28*** 18.31*** 22.15*** 36.85*** 
n2ll 270.80 275.21 289.62 266.36 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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When I compare the long-term effects of military dependency from the 20-Year ArDL models to 
those of the original models I come to the following conclusions. First, the coefficient for aid 
dependency is approximately 107.5% larger than its coefficient in the original model (4.389 compared to 
2.115). The measure of arms dependency is not a significant predictor of the number of Americans killed 
in the long-term, but it was a sizeable predictor in the short-term possessing a coefficient of 2.616. The 
effect of troop dependency, like aid dependency, is larger in the long-term than in the short-term with 
the long-term standardized coefficient being 49.4% larger (2.772 compared to 1.855). I find that the 
long-term effects of military dependency on the number of Americans killed by terrorist attacks 
produced by a military dependency of the U.S. are markedly different than the short-term effects 
reported previously. While the effects of military arms dependency may increase the likelihood of 
having Americans killed in terrorist attacks in the short-term they do not have an effect on whether 
Americans are killed in the long-term. The effect of military aid dependency appears to be much more 
harmful in the long-term than in the short-term. The effect of U.S. troops dependency is larger in the 
long-term than in the short-term but it is not as harmful as military aid dependency. 
Overall, evaluating both dependent variables from Neumayer & Plümper’s original analysis led 
me to the following conclusions. It is clear that the long-term effects of both military aid and troop 
dependency are larger in the long-term than in the short-term. In fact, these effects increase most when 
modeling the number of anti-American terrorist attacks. Using both of the dependent variables, the 
increase is twice as much for the long-term effects of aid than the increase in the long-term effects of 
troops and these effects manifest themselves in approximately half the time for attacks as compared to 
kills. What is unclear in these analyses is the role that military arms dependency has on both of the 
outcomes. In the short-term it is a statistically significant predictor of the number of Americans killed 
but it does not have a significant long-term effect. Conversely with the number of anti-American attacks, 
this variable is not a significant predictor in the short-term but is quite a large one in the long-term. On 
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this point the long-term processes appear to operate in the opposite direction. I find evidence that the 
long-term effects of both military aid and troop dependency accumulate in the long-term. This finding 
suggests that use of existing studies, which examine only the short-term effects of military dependency, 
for the extrapolation of long-term effects run a serious risk of misstating the nature of military 
dependency on the U.S. 
Replication: “Ideologies of Violence” 
Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) utilize 12 models in their study comparing the structural 
contexts of two types of ideological terrorism, Islamist and Leftist, from 1973-2002. As with the previous 
study, the unit of analysis here is country. The main emphasis of their paper is to compare the social 
origins of Islamist and Leftist terrorism by incorporating in their statistical models several major 
theoretical explanations of transnational terrorism. Their thesis is that Islamist terrorism represents a 
distinctive wave of terrorism that although it may be related to Leftist terrorism, it is something distinct. 
They use the comparison of estimated coefficients from their statistical models as their evidence to 
support their conclusion that ideological Islamist terrorism is a distinctive yet related type of terrorism.  
Each of their models incorporates in a stepwise manner, operationalizations of a different 
theoretical approach used to explain transnational terrorism. By the end of these six modeling steps, the 
authors have built a statistical model incorporating many major theoretical approaches which is 
subsequently used to compare these two ideological types of terrorism. Models 1-6 are the models 
associated with Islamist ideological transnational terrorism and models 7-12 are those associated with 
Leftist ideological transnational terrorism. The variable that holds particular value for my project is that 
of Western military dependency. Here, this theoretical construct is measured with a dichotomous 
indicator symbolizing that a Western national sold military arms to a less-developed country in a given 
year. A full list of the variables used in the original analysis and my replication are given in Table 4.09 
and their relevant summary statistics are given in Table 4.10 below. 
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Table 4.09 Description of Variables Used and Sources for Robison et al. (2006) Replication 
Models 
Variable Description of Variable Source(s) 
Islamist Terrorist Attacks 
Number of all terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamist 
Groups 
Iterate, Robison et al. 
(2006) 
Leftist Terrorist Attacks 
Number of all terrorist attacks perpetrated by Leftist Groups 
Iterate, Robison et al. 
(2006) 
Population Logged Natural Log of the total population World Bank 
% Urban Percept of the population living in urban areas World Bank 
GDP/per capita Gross Domestic Product divided by the size of the population World Bank 
GDP/per capita Square 
Gross Domestic Product divided by the size of the population 
- Square World Bank 
Political Rights  
Measure of political rights coded 1 to 7 with 1 being least 
and 7 most Freedom House 
Civil Liberties  
Measure of civil liberties coded 1 to 7 with 1 being least and 
7 most Freedom House 
Trade/GDP Amount of Trade divided by a country's GDP World Bank 
Foreign Investment/GDP 
Amount of Foreign investment in a country divided by a 
country's GDP World Bank 
Western Military Dependency 
Dummy Variable indicating a Western country selling arms 
to an underdeveloped country US ACDA 2003 
Iranian Revolution (> 1979) 
Dummy Variable indicating if the year was greater than the 
date of the Iranian Revolution Author 
Cold War (<1991) 
Dummy Variable indicating if a year was during the cold war, 
before 1991 Author 
Government Consumption/GDP Measure of Government consumption divided by GDP World Bank 
Log of % Muslim Natural Log of the percent of the population that is Muslim Barrett et al. 2001 
Log of % Muslim Square 
Natural Log of the percent of the population that is Muslim-
Square Barrett et al. 2001 
Female Labor Force (%) 
Percent of the female population that is active in the labor 
force World Bank 
Female Labor Force X Govt. Cons. 
Interaction of the percent of female in the labor force and 
measure of government consumption World Bank 
 
The most pertinent finding for my study is that of the effect of Western Military Dependency on 
transnational terrorism. Table 4.11 presents the replication results and the short-term conclusions that 
Western military dependency is statistically significant for Islamist terrorist attacks but not for Leftist 
terrorist attacks when all of the predictor variables are included in the models. The size of the effect for 
Western military dependency on Islamist attacks from model five is 1.26212.  If a country is dependent 
on the West for their military arms supplies then they are more likely to be a producer nation of Islamist 
attacks by a factor of 3.53 in the short-term. Although there are some preliminary models that show 
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that Western military dependency is a significant predictor of Leftist terrorism, when all the 
independent variables are include in the model the short-term effect is not significant.  
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics and Variables in the Replication Model 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Islamist Terrorist Attacks 3006 0.11 0.81 0.00 27.00 
Leftist Terrorist Attacks 3006 0.36 1.83 0.00 33.00 
Population Logged 3006 15.94 1.67 12.02 20.97 
% Urban 3006 50.18 23.86 4.13 97.39 
GDP/per capita 3006 7.60 1.56 4.44 10.76 
GDP/per capita Square 3006 6.21 24.44 19.71 115.68 
Political Rights (Freedom House) 3006 4.53 2.16 1.00 7.00 
Civil Liberties (Freedom House) 3006 4.41 1.84 1.00 7.00 
Trade/GDP 3006 70.99 38.61 6.32 282.40 
Foreign Investment/GDP 3006 2.93 5.36 0.00 145.20 
Western Military Dependency 3006 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Iranian Revolution (> 1979) 3006 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Cold War (<1991) 3006 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Government Consumption/GDP 3006 16.30 6.79 2.98 64.39 
Log of % Muslim 3006 1.89 1.70 0.00 4.61 
Log of % Muslim Square 3006 6.45 7.89 0.00 21.27 
Female Labor Force (%) 3006 37.44 9.07 5.52 52.72 
Female Labor Force X Govt. Consumption 3006 610.49 309.88 57.41 2930.50 
 
Dependent Variable: Islamist Attacks 
To incorporate the theory of the variation of terrorism with variation in duration of military 
dependency I then evaluate these same models using the six selected approaches for measuring long-
term effects described above. A summary table of my findings for Islamist attacks can be found in Table 
4.12 above. I found that a 15-Year PDL2 model produced the largest effect of Western military 
dependency on Islamist attacks. The results from this model are reported in Table 4.13 and contain the 
relevant variables that make this model comparable to model five in the replication models, the model 
without the time trend. The gamma coefficients for the three Z-variables needed to describe a 
polynomial impulse function of lagged values were -0.428 (0.2246) for Z0, 0.254 (0.0585) for Z1, and        
-0.015 (0.0036) for Z2. These gamma coefficients were then used to recover the standardized beta  
 
 
Table 4.11 Negative Binomial General Linear Model with AR1 of Military Dependency for Islamist and Leftist Terrorist Attacks, 
1973-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Islamist 
Attacks           
Leftist 
Attacks           
Population (logged) 0.126 0.501** 0.764*** 0.723*** 0.802*** 0.850*** 0.514*** 0.266** 0.296** 0.329** 0.331** 0.315** 
 (0.60) (2.43) (3.91) (3.59) (3.90) (4.38) (5.26) (2.29) (2.20) (2.34) (2.32) (2.19) 
GDP/per capita 0.469 -2.321 0.988 2.838 4.128* 4.236* 5.790*** 4.876*** 4.456** 3.921** 3.968** 3.947** 
 (0.40) (-0.83) (0.48) (1.45) (1.93) (1.95) (3.13) (2.88) (2.41) (1.97) (2.03) (2.03) 
GDP/per capita Square -0.059 0.137 -0.085 -0.194* -0.279** -0.291** -0.352*** -0.283*** -0.271** -0.242* -0.246** -0.242** 
 (-0.86) (0.73) (-0.65) (-1.65) (-2.14) (-2.19) (-3.03) (-2.82) (-2.37) (-1.94) (-1.99) (-1.99) 
% Urban 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.005 
 (2.89) (3.46) (2.72) (5.47) (5.27) (4.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.41) (0.51) (0.31) 
Trade % GDP 
 
0.020*** 0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 
-0.019** -0.016* -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
 
 
(3.96) (0.90) (-1.40) (-1.10) (-1.01) 
 
(-2.03) (-1.69) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.44) 
Foreign Direct Investment % 
GDP 
 
-0.360*** -0.184** -0.045 -0.041 -0.021 
 
-0.225*** -0.224*** -0.152** -0.151** -0.163** 
 
 
(-3.20) (-2.41) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.28) 
 
(-2.91) (-2.89) (-2.35) (-2.43) (-2.49) 
Western Military Dependency 
(1=yes) 
 
2.061* 1.633*** 1.499*** 1.262*** 1.191*** 
 
0.627* 0.709* 0.539 0.620 0.645 
 
 
(1.65) (2.59) (2.99) (2.83) (2.68) 
 




0.430*** 0.394*** 0.365** 0.376** 
  
0.298* 0.370** 0.351** 0.341** 
  
 
(2.75) (2.83) (2.39) (2.55) 
  




-0.535*** -0.158 -0.216 -0.265 
  
-0.017 -0.140 -0.072 -0.057 
  
 
(-2.86) (-0.73) (-0.96) (-1.17) 
  
(-0.09) (-0.74) (-0.38) (-0.30) 
Govt. Consumption (% GDP) 
 
 
0.160*** 0.070** -0.155*** -0.172*** 
  
-0.004 -0.004 0.129 0.127 
  
 
(6.15) (2.29) (-2.90) (-3.27) 
  
(-0.07) (-0.07) (1.17) (1.13) 
Log of % Muslim 
 
  
4.287*** 4.511*** 4.664*** 
      
  
  
(5.42) (5.99) (5.76) 
      
 
Log of % Muslim Square 
 
  
-0.644*** -0.700*** -0.722*** 
      
  
  
(-4.29) (-4.85) (-4.74) 
      Female Workers (% Labor 
Force)  
  
-0.069*** -0.229*** -0.229*** 
   
-0.018 0.054 0.043 
  
  
(-2.92) (-5.59) (-5.53) 
   








-0.308 -0.305 0.070 
      
  
  
(-1.07) (-0.92) (0.16) 
      
  
   
0.007*** 0.007*** 
    
-0.004 -0.004 
Female Workers X Govt. 
Consumption 
    
(4.58) (4.66) 
    
(-1.10) (-1.03) 
Year-count 
     
-0.034 
     
0.027 
 
     
(-0.93) 
     
(1.05) 
Cold War Dummy (1 if year < 
1991) 
         
0.890*** 0.927*** 1.117*** 
 
         
(3.03) (3.17) (3.27) 
Constant -8.792* -6.828 -23.688** -33.567*** -34.443*** -35.591*** -32.719*** -24.683*** -24.287*** -22.627** -25.502*** -25.380*** 
 (-1.82) (-0.62) (-2.56) (-3.06) (-2.99) (-3.13) (-4.01) (-3.48) (-2.79) (-2.40) (-2.92) (-2.93) 
Observations 2884 2884 2884 2675 2675 2675 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 
Number of Countries 139 139 139 138 138 138 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Prob. Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 






coefficients for the 15 lagged values and the current value of Western military dependency using Table 
E.1 in Appendix E. These resulting standardized beta coefficients were then summed and equaled 4.67. 
The size of this coefficient for the 15-Year Lagged PDL2 model is 270% larger than the short-term effect 
reported in the original model. This leads to the conclusion that reporting only the short-term effect of 
Western military dependency grossly underestimates the total effect that this variable may have in the 
long-term. 
Dependent Variable: Leftist Attacks 
The same type of analysis was carried out on the dependent variable Leftist terrorist attacks and 
the summary table of my findings is reported in Table 4.14. I found that a 15-Year ArDL model was the 
most appropriate model for portraying the long-term effects of Western military dependency on Leftist 
terrorist attacks. The results from this individual model are displayed in Table 4.15. There is only one Z-
variable in the ArDL model and it has a gamma coefficient of 0.02 (0.006). Using the procedures 
described in Appendix D., the total standardized beta coefficient was 2.86 and statistically significant 
compared with a non-significant short-term effect of Western military dependency on Leftist terrorism. 
Here we see that the short-term and long-term effects diverge and hold with it the potential that 
conclusions based only on the short-term effect may yield a false impression of the potential influence 
of Western military dependency on Leftist terrorism.  
Overall, some conclusions can be drawn from these long-term extensions of Robison et al.’s 
models. First I find that Western military dependency, which basically stands for the concept of arms 
sales to the developing world, is found to be consistently statistically significant in the long-term for 
both Islamist and Leftist terrorism. This result is divergent from the short-term findings of this data in 
that Western military dependency was not a significant predictor of Leftist terrorism in the short-term.  
Another interesting finding from my extension is that there is consistent evidence that the time lag of 
15-years is most appropriate in both sets of these models. This long-term time horizon is completely 
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missed when only contemporaneous causes of terrorism are examined. Also, there was a much wider 
range of other potential explanations of terrorism explored in Robison et al.’s  compared to Neumayer & 
Plümper’s analysis. This fact is good preliminary evidence that the long-term effect of arms sales is 
robust in the presence of several other prominent explanations of terrorism. Further, the analysis 
undertaken here is suggestive that a much wider range of ideological terrorism may have long-term 
outlays in their explanations. 










Results from Best-Fitting Model 
Key Substantive Interpretation from 
the Identified Best-Fitting Model 
Replication 
Model 
Robison et al.'s 
original model 
specification 
Yes, arms sales Western Military 
Dependency is statistically 
significant in all models. In the full 
model without the time trend 
(Model 5), the effect of the binary 
variable is 1.191 (2.68) 
Arms sales dependency is a statistically 
significant predictor of all Islamist 






Yes, arms sales Western Military 
Dependency is statistically 
significant in all models except the 
full model without the time trend. 
In the full model with the time 
trend (Model 6), the effect of the 
binary variable is 1.03. 
 
Arms sales dependency is a statistically 
significant predictor of all Islamist 




2-Year Lags Inconsistent 
This method appeared to present 
inconsistent results in terms of the 
coefficients and the sign of the 
coefficients when two or more lagged 
values of the military dependency 
variable were included Suggests 
moving to restricted lag models. 





10 or 15 Years 
There is evidence for Western 
Military Dependency at both the 10 
and 15 year lag lengths.  
The total effect for the 10 year is 
3.14014 with 2375=N, and with 15 year 
3.89832 with 1971=N. The 20 year lag 
is a very small increase and for the cost 






15 of 20 Year 
There is evidence for Western 
Military Dependency at both the 15 
and 20 year lag lengths.  
The 20-Year PDL2 fits the model best 
and has the largest effect. The effect of 
the betas summed is 5.245. The 15-
year model fits almost as well and the 
sum of its betas is 4.6653. It is clear 
that there the Almon Second Degree 
DL fits the data well for 20 years.  
Polynomial 
DL 3 Model 
(PDL3M) 
None 
There is no evidence for any of the 
PDL3 models having an effect on 
Islamist terrorism 
None of the PDL3 DL models fit the 
data good for Islamist attacks. None of 








The Western Military dependency 
variable is not significant, the 
interaction is statistically 
significant, but the substantial 
presence of U.S. troops is not 
significant 
The model does not appear to fit the 
data well. This is not too surprising 
considering it is more appropriate for 






Left for future research The use of Latent Curve Models would 
be a more appropriate method to use 
for Robison et al.'s original research 
question. Thus this research question 






Table 4.13 Negative Binomial 15-Year PDL2 with AR1 of Military 
Dependency for Islamist Terrorist Attacks, 1973-2002 
  Islamist Attacks 
Population (logged) 0.423*** 
 (0.1409) 
GDP/per capita 8.995*** 
 (2.3901) 
GDP/per capita Square -0.612*** 
 (0.1547) 
% Urban 0.067*** 
 (0.0148) 
Trade % GDP -0.006 
 (0.0053) 
Foreign Direct Investment % GDP 0.003 
 (0.052) 
15-Year "Z0-Variable" Military Dependency  -0.428** 
 (0.2246) 
15-Year "Z1-Variable" Military Dependency  0.254*** 
 (0.0585) 
15-Year "Z2-Variable" Military Dependency  -0.015*** 
 (0.0036) 
Political Rights 0.231 
 (0.1503) 
Civil Liberties -0.178 
 (0.249) 
Govt. Consumption (% GDP) -0.473*** 
 (0.1356) 
Log of % Muslim 5.289*** 
 (0.7549) 
Log of % Muslim Square -0.883*** 
 (0.1541) 
Female Workers (% Labor Force) -0.431*** 
 (0.1005) 





Number of Countries 118 
Prob. Chi2 0 











Results from Best-Fitting Model 
Key Substantive Interpretation from 






No, arms sales Western Military 
dependency is not statistically 
significant. In the full model but it is 
in two preliminary models. The size 
of the coefficients in these 
preliminary models is range from 
approx. 1/3 to 1/2 as much as the 
effect in the comparative Islamist 
models.  
Arms sales dependency is a not a 
statistically significant predictor of all 






Yes, arms sales Western Military 
dependency is statistically significant 
in all models.  In the full model with 
the time trend (Model 11), the effect 
of the binary variable is 0.083, in the 
full model with time trend the 
coefficient is 0.144. 
Arms sales dependency is a 
statistically significant predictor of all 




2-Year Lags Inconsistent 
This method appeared to present 
inconsistent results in terms of the 
coefficients and the sign of the 
coefficients when two or more 
lagged values of the military 
dependency variable were included 
in the model despite the fact that in 
individual models a lag length of two 
was appropriate. Suggests moving to 
restricted lag models. 




10 or 15 Year 
Lags 
There is evidence for Western 
Military Dependency at both the 10 
and 15 year lag lengths.  
This model is not consistent with the 
replication model, or the short term 
model because the level of arms 




None of the PDL2 DL models fit the 
data good for leftist attacks. None of 
the gamma parameter estimates 
were statistically significant. 
This model does not appear to fit the 
data that well. 
Polynomial DL 3 
Model (PDL3M) 
None 
None of the PDL3 DL models fit the 
data good for leftist attacks. None of 
the gamma parameter estimates 
were statistically significant. 
This model does not appear to fit the 






The Western Military dependency 
variable is statistically significant but 
neither the interaction nor the 
substantial presence of U.S. troops is 
significant. 
This model does not appear to fit the 
data that well. This is not too 
surprising considering it is more 








Left for future research 
The use of Latent Curve Models 
would be a more appropriate 
method to use for Robison et al.'s 
original research question. Thus this 
research question requires attention 





Table 4.15 Negative Binomial 15-Year  ArDL AR1 of Military Dependency for  
Leftist Terrorist Attacks, 1973-2002 
  Leftist Attacks 
Population (logged) -0.039 
 
(0.126) 
GDP/per capita 1.23 
 
(2.538) 
GDP/per capita Square -0.11 
 
(0.174) 
% Urban 0.03 
 
(0.021) 
Trade % GDP -0.01 
 
(0.012) 
Foreign Direct Investment % GDP -0.18** 
 
(0.074) 
15-Year "Z-Variable" Military Dependency  0.02*** 
 
(0.006) 
Political Rights 0.55*** 
 
(0.102) 
Civil Liberties -0.28** 
 
(0.123) 
Govt. Consumption (% GDP) 0.19 
 
(0.128) 
Female Workers (% Labor Force) 0.15* 
 
(0.089) 
Female Workers X Govt. Consumption -0.01 
 
(0.004) 







Number of Countries 118 
Prob. Chi2 0 








V. Discussion and Conclusion 
In conclusion, the extensions that I present above point to contributions not only in the 
substantive literature on terrorism but also in the methodological literature on cumulative, long-
term effects. Below I will summarize the most important substantive results from my study 
followed by a summary of the methodological findings. Lastly, I will point to implications that 
these results may hold for future studies of terrorism. 
Summary of Substantive Findings 
I draw attention to five main substantive findings from my preceding analysis on the 
nature of the long-term impacts of military dependency on terrorism. A country’s dependent 
position in the procurement of military resources such as aid, arms, and troops holds serious 
implications for a variety of terrorist outcomes in both the short and long-term.  In some cases 
the long-term consequences of military dependency were isomorphic with the short-term 
consequences, for example in the impact of U.S. military aid and troop deployment on anti-
American terrorist attacks. In other cases, such in the case Western military dependency’s effect 
on Leftist terrorist attacks, there are divergent findings in the long-term from those established 
in the short term but none-the-less there is evidence of significant long-term effects. A second 
key finding is the fact that the long-term effects of military dependency are substantially larger 
than those of short-term effects. These impacts were reported above to be ranging from 49% to 
270% larger in the long-term than in the short-term. This makes it clear that in many cases the 
long-term effects of military dependency can be far more serious than have previously been 
reported. Third, the time frame in which statistically significant long-term effects of military 
dependency were found was consistently between 10 to 15 years. A potential reason for this 
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length of lag was only briefly elaborated upon above. Fourth, the long-term effects do lend 
partial support to what I have identified as Johnson’s “Blowback Thesis”, the largest effects have 
not stemmed from placement of U.S. troops abroad but rather the from lending of military aid 
to military dependencies. Fifth, apparent from my preceding replications and extensions is that 
there are significant long-term effects of military dependency that have been overlooked in the 
literature.  
Summary of Methodological Findings 
In this study I proposed a variety of methodologies to evaluate the long-term effects of 
military dependency on terrorism including the following models: 1-Running Sum; 2-Ad Hoc 
Distributed Lags; 3-Arithmetic DLs; 4-Polynomial DLs; 5-Long-Term Interactions; and 6-Growth 
Curve Models. From these methods I found evidence that the Running Sum, Ad Hoc DL, and 
Long-Term Interaction models all had limitations which prevented them from giving me a clear 
signal that they were appropriate for my analysis. The methodologies that I found most 
applicable to the present analyses were the Arithmetic DL and Second Degree Polynomial DL 
models. These DL methodologies are not as commonly utilized in the disciplines of Sociology and 
Political Science as they are in specific applications of Econometrics. These methodologies are 
also not built-in parts of canned statistical software programs such as the one I utilized for my 
analysis, Stata. 
Distributed Lag models such as the ArDL and the PDL which I utilized allowed for the 
incorporation of multiple lagged-values of the independent variables of military dependency 
without the penalty of one degree of freedom for each lag, leading to estimation problems, nor 
producing inconsistent results due to complications posed by multicollinearity in the way that 
including unrestricted and unstructured distributed lags did in my analyses. Further these 
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models are relatively straight forward after a moderate learning curve is achieved. Overall, I 
suspect that they could play a larger role in the social sciences in a growing number of areas. 
While I did not utilize with much satisfaction Growth Curve models, specifically the SEM 
framework’s LCMs I believe still possess a tremendous amount of potential in future analyses of 
long-term effects. An obvious reason for this potential is the growing realization that the SEM 
framework is in fact a more general framework which encompasses, with the proper 
restrictions, the regression-based methods that are currently viewed as alternate models. Also, 
LCMs are continuing to be extended to incorporate more complicated topics such as limited 
dependent variables, such as counts, and this knowledge is not currently universal in the way 
that regression-based methodologies are. 
Implications for Future Research 
This project has engendered a number of questions for future research. A primary 
question from the above analysis is why the lengths of lags are nearly twice as long for the 
outcome of anti-American attacks as for the outcome of Americans killed?  I suspect that the 
answer might have more to do with the indigenous resources of terrorist movements than with 
the political opportunity structure in which these terrorist movements operate. This suspicion 
naturally is in part motivated by my study of the literature on social movements and the debates 
in the literature on approaches for explaining social movement mobilizations. A second question 
is how to square the contradictory effects of the short and long-term consequences of military 
arms dependency on the two outcomes found in the re-analysis of Neumayer & Plümper’s 
work? Is there something inherent in the nature of these two outcomes that could play a 
confounding role in how arms dependency impacts them? Third, I think it would be a useful 
exercise to scrutinize the concept of military dependency by examining the dimensionality of 
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this concept. Both of these analyses have made assumptions about the concept in terms of its 
dimensionality and in terms of the most important indicators of it.  
Neither of these studies analyzed here, make any reference to Boswell and Dixon’s 
important work which in essence argued that the concept of dependency itself was 
multidimensional and had a separate political dimension beyond the economic one that had 
been previously assumed. "Our thesis is that economic and political dependency independently 
contribute to rebellious violence through their deleterious effects on internal economic and 
state structure" (Boswell and Dixon 1990, p. 541). I would argue against Boswell and Dixon and 
hypothesize that there is a military dimension to dependency that is analytically distinct from 
both economic and political dependency. "Military dependency comprise the value of foreign 
military penetration (imports of weapons and supplies) and the diversity of comparable options 
(alternate suppliers and the capability for self-reliance). This is a direct government to 
government dependence that is analytically and substantively independent of economic 
dependency"(Boswell and Dixon 1990: 543).  These are just part of the conjectures that they 
make about military dependency.  
This project has shown that, on average, the blowback of long-term military dependency 
is even greater than the short-term blowback which has been captured in the previous work of 
Neumayer and Plumper and Robison et al. However, this finding is contrary, for most cases, than 
the little relationship shown in my preliminary bivariate analyses (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). This 
observation leads me to ask why this might be the case. I suspect that there are a number of 
reasons for this anomaly.  First, the bivariate models belie certain distorting influences caused 
by the covariates included in the multiple regression models. This is a general issue realized 
when moving from bivariate models to multiple covariate models (Lewis-Beck, 1980, p. 47). A 
second general reason also applicable here is that there is the possibility of specification error. 
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This problem really boils down to a problem at the level of model building (Berry and Feldman, 
1985, pp. 25-26) and may have been present in my analysis here. I started my project by 
replicating two existing studies which were the best examples of research on the influence of 
military dependency on terrorism and thus, made the assumption that both previous studies 
had identified the best model for the data. My goal was to change one aspect of these existing 
models, the short-term nature of military dependency to long-term military dependency, and 
not to build the “best” model of terrorism. A third potential reason for this incongruity between 
the bivariate and multiple covariate models is that there was not much discussion in the original 
analyses about the impact of outlying observations. Bollen and Jackman (1985) have outlined 
multiple consequences of unusual observations in cross-national studies and these issues may 
have not been adequately addressed in the existing research.  
Further, I call for more attention in current transnational terrorism research to be paid 
to an earlier generation of cross-national research that focused on the role of international 
forces in domestic rebellion (e.g., Chase-Dunn, 1975; Robinson, 1976; Evans and Timberlake, 
1980; Deloacroix and Ragin, 1981; London and Robinson, 1989; Boswell and Dixon, 1990) and on 
the work of dependency theorists themselves (e.g., Frank, 1967, 1979; Cardoso, 1977). There is 
the potential for better analysis if the parallel debates of an earlier generation of research are 
incorporated into the research on terrorism especially when transnational terrorism is framed as 
a battle for control of domestic political power. 
I conclude by restating that there is a vast research potential relating transitional 
terrorism to forms of dependency including military dependency. I have consistently found that 
the long-term effects of military dependency on several terrorist outcomes are often stronger 
than the short-term effects and not always consistent with them. Research that fails to consider 
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long-term effects when providing public statements or policy recommendations runs the risk of 






APPENDIX A: CORRELATION TABLES 
Table A.1 Correlation Table from Neumayer & Plümper (2009) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Anti-American attacks 1.000 
        Number of Americans killed 0.143 1.000 
       Natural Log of Population 0.113 0.009 1.000 
      Natural Log of Distance b/t Capitals -0.013 0.007 -0.076 1.000 
     Natural Log of GDP/per capita 0.016 0.010 -0.085 -0.289 1.000 
    Polity IV Democracy Measure 0.040 -0.005 0.112 -0.212 0.489 1.000 
   Military Aid Dependency on U.S. 0.038 0.029 -0.048 -0.005 -0.039 0.016 1.000 
  Military Arms Dependency on U.S. 0.002 0.002 -0.047 -0.011 0.020 -0.004 0.013 1.000 
 Military Troop Dependency on U.S. 0.005 0.003 -0.055 -0.013 0.078 0.079 0.003 0.024 1.000 
 
 
Table A.2 Correlation Table from Robison et al. (2006)                   
   (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
          
(6) (7) (8) (9)                   (10) 
Islamist Terrorist 
Attacks 1 
         Leftist Terrorist 
Attacks 0.082 1 
        Population Logged 0.007 0.117 1 
       GDP/per capita 0.082 0.051 -0.032 1 
      GDP/per capita 
Square 0.079 0.042 -0.014 0.995 1 
     % Urban 0.128 0.075 0.023 0.83 0.815 1 
    Trade/GDP 0.025 -0.132 -0.614 0.133 0.108 0.103 1 
   Foreign 
Investment/GDP -0.037 -0.062 -0.164 0.15 0.151 0.147 0.353 1 
  Western Mil. 
Dependency 0.095 0.144 0.429 0.414 0.415 0.352 -0.226 -0.035 1 
 Political Rights  0.035 0.083 -0.03 0.653 0.653 0.544 0.078 0.1 0.205 1 
Civil Liberties  0.017 0.042 -0.091 0.687 0.692 0.561 0.107 0.129 0.186 0.917 
Government 
Cons./GDP 0.214 -0.077 -0.315 0.309 0.314 0.239 0.382 0.151 0.07 0.126 
Log of % Muslim 0.077 -0.095 0.047 -0.438 -0.433 -0.355 -0.023 -0.118 -0.066 -0.522 
Log of % Muslim 
Square 0.051 -0.084 0.031 -0.392 -0.394 -0.304 -0.015 -0.127 -0.031 -0.512 
Female Labor Force 
(%) -0.077 -0.104 0.034 -0.153 -0.113 -0.226 -0.074 0.051 -0.209 0.044 
Fem Labor Force X 
Govt. Cons. 0.12 -0.1 -0.234 0.191 0.214 0.097 0.264 0.159 -0.042 0.182 
Iranian Revolution 
(> 1979) -0.063 -0.021 0.016 -0.05 -0.048 0.02 0.061 0.068 -0.114 0.005 
           Cold War (<1991) 0.048 0.1 -0.058 -0.025 -0.025 -0.145 -0.155 -0.265 0.153 -0.116 
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Table A.2 (cont.) 
 
 
(11)    (12)    (13)  (14)    (15)    (16)      (17)        (18) 
Islamist Terrorist 
Attacks 
        Leftist Terrorist 
Attacks 
        Population Logged 
        GDP/per capita 
        GDP/per capita 
Square 
        % Urban 
        Trade/GDP 
        Foreign 
Investment/GDP 
        Western Mil. 
Dependency 
        Political Rights  
        Civil Liberties  1 
       Government 
Cons./GDP 0.157 1 
      Log of % Muslim -0.533 -0.018 1 
     Log of % Muslim 
Square -0.521 0.003 0.968 1 
    Female Labor Force 
(%) 0.061 0.004 -0.222 -0.296 1 
   Fem Labor Force X 
Govt. Cons. 0.217 0.816 -0.19 -0.204 0.533 1 
  Iranian Revolution (> 
1979) -0.048 -0.008 0.029 0.014 0.13 0.059 1 
 Cold War (<1991) -0.088 0.036 0.062 0.078 -0.204 -0.074 -0.286 1 
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APPENDIX B: DEPENDENT VARIABLES 









1968 57 . 20 8 
1969 93 . 38 12 
1970 225 . 43 38 
1971 218 . 26 42 
1972 146 . 170 32 
1973 112 . 40 30 
1974 145 . 38 90 
1975 112 . 26 52 
1976 121 . 30 70 
1977 93 . 26 72 
1978 69 12 20 36 
1979 90 16 26 34 
1980 111 9 40 76 
1981 117 16 26 80 
1982 148 13 20 66 
1983 84 271 54 44 
1984 92 16 52 64 
1985 95 231 62 96 
1986 131 15 40 84 
1987 98 7 39 60 
1988 97 199 30 72 
1989 100 7 19 42 
1990 115 10 16 52 
1991 168 10 30 88 
1992 70 14 22 46 
1993 69 19 32 42 
1994 56 8 56 36 
1995 54 13 44 16 
1996 46 27 22 28 
1997 30 . 16 24 
1998 48 15 15 10 
1999 150 8 12 40 
2000 33 19 16 22 
2001 29 193 15 10 
2002 66 31 34 8 
2003 73 16 84 20 
2004 56 70 . . 
2005 26 23 . . 
2006 25 7 . . 






APPENDIX C: GRAPHS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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Islamist vs. Leftist Terrorist Attacks
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APPENDIX D: ARITHMETIC DL 
The following steps outline the simple bivariate estimation process of the Arithmetic Lag 
Model13. Begin with the general DL model shown below and also used in the estimation of 
unrestricted, finite lag models, as described in method one. 
                                         (D1) 
1. Impose the linearly declining structure on the beta coefficients as computed from the 
following table and substitute into equation D1 to form equation D2. 
                                                (D2) 
2. Factor out the parameter to be estimated, gamma, to form equation D3. 
                                               (D3) 
3. Simplify the equation by defining the vector Z as                             
      and subsitutiing it into equation D4. 
                                       (D4) 
4. Estimate the equation using the equation D5. 
                (D5) 
5. The estimated coefficient gamma (γ), can then be used with the known parameters, i and k to 
solve for each of the    coefficients using Table D.1. 
 
Table D.1 Arithmetic DL Beta Coefficient Pattern 







(k-i + 1)γ 
0 β0 (k + 1)γ 
1 β1 k γ 
2 2 (k – 1)γ 
3 β3    (k – 2)γ 
… … … 
k-2 βk-2 3γ 
k-1 βk-1 2γ 
k βk    γ 
   
 
 
                                                          
13
 Multiple regression of the ArDL Model is a straight-forward extension of the general bivariate case. 
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APPENDIX E: SECOND DEGREE PDL 
The following abbreviated steps outline the simple bivariate estimation process of the Second 
Degree Polynomial DL Model. Begin with the general DL model shown below and also used in 
the estimation of unrestricted, finite lag models, as described in method one. 
                                         (E1) 
 
1. Substitute the beta coefficients (β0-βk) for three new coefficients (Z0t , Z1t , Z2t ) that in 
combination will represent a second degree polynomial lag structure. Here only three unknown 
parameters Z0, Z1, and Z2 have to be estimated instead of having to estimate k+1 unknown 
parameters, β0to βk.  
                          
 
                     (E2) 
                         
 
                   (E3) 
       
                   
 
     
         (E4) 
2. Next the equation is solved for the alpha (α) and gamma parameters (γ) using equation E.5. 
  
                                      (E5) 
3. Recover the individual beta parameters using the estimated values for α, γ0 , γ1 , and γ3 and 
the known values for i and k while using Table E.1. 
Table E.1 Second Degree PDL Beta Coefficient Pattern 






γ0  γ1 k …  γp k 2
 
0 β0 γ0 
1 β1 γ0 γ1  γ2 
2 β2 γ0   γ1   γ2 
3 β3    γ0 3 γ1 9 γ2 
… … … 
k-2 βk-2 γ0+(k-   γ1+(k-2)2 γ2 
k-1 βk-1 γ0+(k-   γ1+(k-1)2 γ2 
k βk    γ0 k γ1+k2 γ2 





APPENDIX F: THIRD DEGREE PDL 
The following abbreviated steps outline the simple bivariate estimation process of the Third 
Degree Polynomial DL Model. Begin with the general DL model shown below and also used in 
the estimation of unrestricted, finite lag models, as described in method one. 
                                         (F1) 
 
1. Substitute the beta coefficients (β0-βk) for three new coefficients (Z0t , Z1t , Z2t ) that in 
combination will represent a second degree polynomial lag structure. Here three unknown 
parameters Z0, Z1, and Z2 have to be estimated instead of having to estimate k+1 unknown 
parameters, β0to βk.  
                          
 
                     (F2) 
                         
 
                   (F3) 
       
                   
 
     
         (F4) 
       
                   
 
     
         (F5) 
2. Next the equation is solved for the alpha (α)and gamma parameters (γ)using equation F.5. 
  
                                            (F6) 
3. Recover the individual beta parameters using the estimated values for α, γ0 , γ1 , γ2 , and γ3 
and the known values for i and k while using Table F.1. 
Table F.1 Third Degree PDL Beta Coefficient Pattern 







γ0  γ1 k … γp k 3
 
0 β0 γ0 
1 β1 γ0 γ1  γ2  γ3 
2 2 γ0   γ1   γ2   6γ3 
3 β3    γ0 3 γ1 9 γ2  6 γ3 
… … … 
k-2 βk-2 γ0 +(k-   γ1+(k-2)2 γ2 + (k-2)3 γ3 
k-1 βk-1 γ0 +(k-   γ1+(k-1)2 γ2 + (k-1)3  γ3 
k βk    γ0 k γ1+ k2 γ2 + k3  γ3 






Variables Used in Long-Term Models -Neumayer & Plümper 
 Core Vars. Used in All  Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Number of Anti-American Attacks 3341 0.31 2.01 0.00 90.00 
Number of Americans Killed  3341 0.07 0.66 0.00 19.00 
LN Population 3341 16.09 1.47 12.72 20.99 
LN Distance 3341 8.39 1.15 0.00 9.15 
LN GDP/per capita 3341 7.40 1.59 3.80 10.75 
Democracy 3341 1.63 7.35 -10.00 10.00 
Additional Vars.in Original Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Mil. Aid Dep. 3341 3.23 15.57 0.00 646.46 
Mil. Arms Dep. 3341 2.67 9.53 0.00 305.89 
Mil. Troops Dep. 3341 1.42 7.66 0.00 114.33 
Additional Vars. in Running Sum Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Running Sum Mil. Aid Dep. 3963 119.48 448.57 0.00 5410.03 
Running Sum Mil. Arms Dep. 3963 89.86 188.63 0.00 4761.03 
Running Sum Mil. Troop Dep. 4148 34.23 214.26 0.00 7899.06 
Additional Vars. in Unrestricted Lag Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1-Year Lagged Mil. Aid Dep.  4097 3.08 15.28 0.00 646.46 
2-Year Lagged Mil. Aid Dep. 4110 3.12 15.31 0.00 646.46 
1-Year Lagged Mil. Arms Dep. 4097 3.66 75.01 0.00 4761.03 
2-Year Mil. Arms Dep. 4110 3.79 74.92 0.00 4761.03 
1-Year Lagged Mil. Troops Dep. 4286 3.13 60.72 0.00 2007.54 
2-Year Mil. Troops Dep. 4264 3.10 60.84 0.00 2007.54 
Additional Vars. in Short-Term  Interaction Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Substantial U.S. Troop Presence (1=yes 0=no) 4842 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X Mil. Aid Dep. 3909 0.87 5.98 0.00 97.11 
Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X Mil. Arms Dep. 3909 1.10 5.84 0.00 179.28 
Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X Mil. Troops Dep. 4093 2.99 62.08 0.00 2007.54 
Additional Vars. in Long-Term  Interaction Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Running Sum of the # of Years with Substantial. U.S. 
Troop Presence  5396 3.23 7.82 0.00 38.00 
Running Sum with Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X 
Mil. Aid Dep. 3963 12.55 80.42 0.00 1551.87 
Running Sum with Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X 
Mil. Arms Dep. 3963 19.83 92.51 0.00 2057.14 
Running Sum with Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X 
Mil. Troop Dep. 4148 84.44 2122.59 0.00 72271.44 
Additional Vars. in Arithmetic DL Models  N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
5-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 3572 68.91 210.67 0.00 3907.02 
10-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 3261 241.15 877.06 0.00 26066.38 
15-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 2493 462.70 1139.25 0.00 10451.43 
20-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 1840 782.41 1862.65 0.00 13724.38 
25-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 1239 1165.06 2708.61 0.00 17203.25 
30-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. 685 1576.77 3549.26 0.00 23226.10 
5-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 3572 60.72 140.35 0.00 1835.36 
10-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 3261 214.19 406.34 0.00 3476.63 
15-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 2493 435.50 740.74 0.00 5632.35 
20-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 1840 730.35 1186.34 0.00 8601.07 
25-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 1239 1097.58 1733.44 0.00 11617.28 
30-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 685 1548.28 2336.36 0.00 15009.25 
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5-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 3932 27.44 144.99 0.00 1985.90 
10-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 3704 89.21 453.49 0.00 6072.65 
15-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 2917 194.59 968.54 0.00 12305.92 
20-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 2201 338.70 1652.21 0.00 19228.61 
25-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 1502 513.25 2419.17 0.00 26448.05 
30-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Troop Dep. 835 708.52 3097.72 0.00 33375.89 
Additional Vars. in PDL Models  N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
5-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 4179 -0.06 4.40 -0.73 117.10 
5-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 4376 -0.07 12.38 -1.83 386.15 
5-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 4376 -0.27 47.12 -6.70 1519.86 
5-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 4376 -1.19 198.24 -27.40 6700.83 
10-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 3261 -0.33 4.57 -1.34 123.11 
10-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 3431 -1.09 33.84 -6.70 907.25 
10-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 3431 -6.04 270.42 -46.89 7989.30 
10-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 3431 -41.61 2270.36 -368.40 71095.38 
15-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 2493 -0.65 2.95 -1.95 26.71 
15-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 2632 -4.58 24.25 -14.61 327.11 
15-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 2632 -44.71 272.41 -151.01 4120.27 
15-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 2632 -497.95 3369.97 -1753.70 53142.68 
20-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1840 -0.84 3.71 -2.56 26.42 
20-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1966 -7.61 40.78 -25.57 460.43 
20-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1966 -98.68 610.49 -349.52 8058.75 
20-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1966 -1463.21 10076.50 -5370.70 142818.00 
25-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1239 -1.07 4.38 -3.17 25.81 
25-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1354 -12.12 59.98 -39.58 591.31 
25-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1354 -199.12 1111.46 -672.86 13319.92 
25-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 1354 -3747.08 22840.88 -12863.50 301522.00 
30-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 685 -1.26 5.01 -3.78 25.20 
30-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 794 -15.90 84.61 -56.63 719.15 
30-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 794 -294.17 1923.63 -1151.47 19874.70 
30-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Aid Dep. Std. 794 -6270.91 48533.58 -26332.88 548883.60 
5-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 4179 -0.07 0.68 -0.37 9.34 
5-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 4376 -0.16 2.02 -0.93 47.63 
5-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 4376 -0.55 8.31 -3.39 239.37 
5-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 4376 -2.15 37.35 -13.89 1199.93 
10-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 3261 -0.12 1.04 -0.68 10.28 
10-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 3431 -0.44 6.22 -3.39 93.71 
10-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 3431 -2.44 49.15 -23.76 947.29 
10-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 3431 -16.22 424.34 -186.72 9523.82 
15-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2493 -0.15 1.35 -0.99 10.14 
15-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2632 -0.62 12.22 -7.41 138.25 
15-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2632 -3.25 143.98 -76.54 2108.33 
15-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2632 -14.61 1849.67 -888.84 31884.23 
20-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1840 -0.19 1.65 -1.30 9.96 
20-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1966 -0.68 19.64 -12.96 181.25 
20-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1966 -0.04 308.22 -177.15 3707.07 
20-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1966 86.14 5275.99 -2722.07 74962.24 
25-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1239 -0.20 1.95 -1.60 9.72 
25-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1354 -0.13 29.27 -20.06 227.74 
25-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1354 21.44 581.81 -341.03 5728.06 
25-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1354 697.28 12578.83 -6519.71 145207.50 
30-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 685 -0.20 2.27 -1.91 9.48 
30-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 794 1.18 41.95 -28.70 275.78 
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30-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 794 73.11 1017.53 -583.61 8155.88 
30-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 794 2393.25 26685.72 -13346.49 248838.10 
5-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 4544 -0.16 0.74 -0.31 10.26 
5-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 4715 -0.41 1.88 -0.77 27.64 
5-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 4715 -1.48 7.00 -2.83 104.86 
5-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 4715 -6.04 28.94 -11.57 438.79 
10-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3704 -0.29 1.38 -0.57 18.28 
10-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3870 -1.45 7.04 -2.83 93.51 
10-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3870 -10.08 50.25 -19.79 678.13 
10-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3870 -78.88 400.45 -155.50 5489.55 
15-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 2917 -0.40 2.05 -0.82 25.97 
15-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3062 -3.04 15.62 -6.17 201.33 
15-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3062 -31.46 163.24 -63.74 2119.31 
15-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 3062 -365.12 1909.24 -740.21 25122.41 
20-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 2201 -0.52 2.65 -1.08 28.22 
20-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 2343 -5.25 26.78 -10.79 338.48 
20-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 2343 -72.80 363.91 -147.53 4806.39 
20-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 2343 -1130.97 5560.98 -2266.89 75344.45 
25-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 1502 -0.64 3.11 -1.34 27.99 
25-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 1639 -8.18 38.71 -16.71 449.86 
25-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 1639 -143.24 633.10 -284.00 7935.67 
25-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 1639 -2804.78 11722.22 -5429.48 150340.90 
30-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 835 -0.77 3.41 -1.59 27.77 
30-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 966 -11.70 51.08 -23.90 443.42 
30-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 966 -244.77 982.06 -486.02 7755.25 
30-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Troops Dep. Std. 966 -5726.81 21606.01 -11114.69 176316.50 
       
Variables Used in Long-Term Models –Robison et al.  
Core Vars. Used in All  Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Islamist Terrorist Attacks 3006 0.11 0.81 0 27 
Leftist Terrorist Attacks 3006 0.36 1.83 0 33 
Population Logged 3006 15.94 1.67 12.02 20.97 
% Urban 3006 50.18 23.86 4.13 97.39 
GDP/per capita 3006 7.6 1.56 4.44 10.76 
GDP/per capita Square 3006 6.21 24.44 19.71 115.68 
Political Rights (Freedom House) 3006 4.53 2.16 1 7 
Civil Liberties (Freedom House) 3006 4.41 1.84 1 7 
Trade/GDP 3006 70.99 38.61 6.32 282.4 
Foreign Investment/GDP 3006 2.93 5.36 0 145.2 
Western Military Dependency 3006 0.47 0.5 0 1 
Iranian Revolution (> 1979) 3006 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Cold War (<1991) 3006 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Government Consumption/GDP 3006 16.3 6.79 2.98 64.39 
Log of % Muslim 3006 1.89 1.7 0 4.61 
Log of % Muslim Square 3006 6.45 7.89 0 21.27 
Female Labor Force (%) 3006 37.44 9.07 5.52 52.72 
Female Labor Force X Govt. Consumption 3006 610.49 309.88 57.41 2930.5 
Additional Vars. in Running Sum Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Running Sum Mil. Arms Dep. 6450 5.568527 10.18951 0 39 
Additional Vars. in Unrestricted Lag Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1-Year Lagged Mil. Arms Dep. 2855 0.5684764 0.4953756 0 1 
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2-Year Mil. Arms Dep. 2705 0.5752311 0.4943993 0 1 
Additional Vars. in Short-Term  Interaction Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Substantial U.S. Troop Presence (1=yes 0=no) 5767 0.1503381 0.3574335 0 1 
Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X Mil. Arms Dep. 2976 0.055435 0.228882 0 1 
Additional Vars. in Long-Term  Interaction Models N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Running Sum of the # of Years with Substantial. U.S. Troop 
Presence  5814 3.375817 7.882326 0 39 
Running Sum with Substantial. U.S. Troop Presence X Mil. Arms 
Dep. 
3006 1.180639 4.403028 0 33 
Additional Vars. in Arithmetic DL Models  N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
5-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 5474 9.935331 9.035479 0 21 
10-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 4515 31.85028 27.48374 0 66 
15-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 3578 66.92202 55.53467 0 136 
20-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 2761 113.8957 92.84257 0 231 
25-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 1977 173.9433 138.9562 0 351 
30-Year "Z" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. 1221 250.5283 193.5302 0 496 
Additional Vars. in PDL Models  N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
5-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2959 3.456235 2.447424 0 6 
5-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2959 8.698209 6.269945 0 15 
5-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2959 31.94863 23.52853 0 55 
5-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2959 130.8192 98.37289 0 225 
10-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2650 6.5 4.259269 0 11 
10-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2650 32.83019 21.60309 0 55 
10-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2650 230.4558 153.9636 0 385 
10-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2650 1813.118 1230.496 0 3025 
15-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2131 9.555138 6.040795 0 16 
15-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2131 73.09573 45.52833 0 120 
15-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2131 759.8747 476.9143 0 1240 
15-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 2131 8846.915 5617.696 0 14400 
20-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1592 12.55214 7.855214 0 21 
20-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1592 129.4001 78.30763 0 210 
20-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1592 1785.433 1081.171 0 2870 
20-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1592 27539.07 16816.26 0 44100 
25-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1041 15.54179 9.699744 0 26 
25-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1041 201.6744 120.0546 0 325 
25-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1041 3465.411 2055.128 0 5525 
25-Year "Z3" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 1041 66429.38 39720.08 0 105625 
30-Year "Z0" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 495 18.6303 11.52689 0 31 
30-Year "Z1" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 495 289.8687 170.7282 0 465 
30-Year "Z2" Variable Mil. Arms Dep. Std. 495 5954.826 3486.427 0 9455 
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